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Abstract 
We propose and investigate a new channel through which the resource curse - a stylized fact that 
countries rich in natural resources grow slower - operates. Predatory governments are more 
likely to expropriate corporate profits in natural-resource industries when the price of resources 
is higher. Corporations whose profits are more dependent on the price of resources can mitigate 
the risk of expropriation by reducing corporate transparency. Lower transparency, in turn, leads 
to inefficient capital allocation and slower economic growth. Using a panel of 72 industries from 
51 countries over 16 years, we demonstrate that the negative effect of expropriation risk on 
corporate transparency is stronger for industries that are especially vulnerable to expropriation, 
in particular, for industries whose profits are highly correlated with oil prices. Controlling for 
country, year, and industry fixed effects, we find that corporate transparency is lower in more oil 
price-dependent industries when the price of oil is high and property rights are poorly protected. 
Furthermore, corporate growth is hampered in oil price-sensitive industries because of less 
efficient capital allocation driven by adverse effects of lower transparency.  
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 1 
Introduction  
In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid of the 
violence of their superiors, they frequently bury and conceal a great part of their 
[capital] stock. 
Adam Smith (1776).  
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
 
Why are some nations rich and others poor? Why have some poor countries managed to 
catch up with rich countries within one generation’s lifetime, and others have lagged 
behind even further? Paradoxically, the most successful post-war development 
examples have taken place in countries that were poor in natural resources (e.g., The 
Asian tigers) while most resource-rich countries (e.g., those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Middle East, and Latin America) have failed to close the gap with the OECD economies.  
The fact that resource abundance negatively affects economic growth in standard 
growth regressions was first documented by Sachs and Warner (1997) and has become 
known subsequently as the “resource curse”. Recent literature (Lane and Tornell, 1996, 
Ades and Di Tella, 1999, Auty, 2001, Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006, Mehlum, 
Moene, and Torvik, 2006, Caselli, 2006, Hodler, 2006, and Boschini et al., 2006) 
demonstrates that the resource curse is related to the deterioration of economic and 
political institutions. In particular, if resources are discovered in an economy with 
immature institutions, the resulting rent-seeking slows down or even reverses 
institutional development, which in turn, negatively affects growth. This literature 
provides evidence on the interaction between resource abundance and institutions using 
country-level data on economic growth. Nevertheless, it is hard to identify the specific 
channels through which this resource curse works. By definition, institutions change 
slowly so that isolating the effects of particular institutions requires very long-term data.   
In order to understand the mechanism of the resource curse, one needs to use 
microeconomic data. In this paper, we study the effect of the resource abundance on 
corporate finance and corporate performance using industry-level panel from 51 
countries over the period of 1990-2005. We argue that in countries with poor institutions, 
governments are more inclined to expropriate natural-resource rents. This makes firms 
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operating in natural resource sectors especially vulnerable to expropriation and 
provides them with incentives to withhold or manipulate information about their 
performance. The lower transparency, in turn, leads to worse capital allocation and 
slower economic growth.   
We propose a simple theory based on the idea that, during the periods of high 
commodity prices, corporate profits in the natural resource industries represent rents 
that are relatively easy for governments to capture. Firms in such industries face a trade-
off. On the one hand, in order to attract external capital, they desire transparency. On the 
other hand, higher transparency involves a risk of expropriation by the government or 
other potential predators, such as rival companies.1 As argued by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), Friedman et al. (2000), and Stulz (2005), transparency with respect to 
corporate profits can attract scrutiny by politicians and various forms of government 
expropriation, such as the solicitation of bribes, overregulation, disregard of property 
rights, confiscatory taxation, and the outright seizure of firm assets. Transparency would 
therefore be lower in industries that are more vulnerable to expropriation, particularly 
in countries that have poor protection of property rights. 
Consistent with the existing resource curse literature, this argument is especially 
important for oil companies. The quintessential example is the story of Yukos, once 
Russia’s largest and most transparent oil company and once Russia’s richest person 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Khodorkovsky and his partners acquired their stake in a 
notorious loans-for-shares auction and then diluted the stakes of other shareholders 
including foreign investors and the government (Freeland, 2000, Boone and Rodionov, 
2002). Once they assumed control over the majority of voting and cash flow rights, the 
firm’s transparency and corporate governance improved substantially. Khodorkovsky 
was the first of Russian oligarchs to disclose his personal stake in a major company and 
to invite reputable foreigners to join his corporate board. This raised Yukos market 
capitalization fifteen-fold in less than four years but also eventually resulted in the full 
expropriation by the government and imprisonment and exile of the key owners and 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter we consider expropriation by a predatory government. However, our analysis goes 
through if expropriation is conducted by competitors or other private entities. 
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managers. While the official charges against Khodorkovsky were related to tax fraud, 
there is a widespread belief that the government’s assault was driven by a combination 
of his political ambitions and the firm’s openness about its high value.  As a member of 
Russian parliament and a former colleague of Khodorkovsky said,  
 
"The real threat that Khodorkovsky posed was that Khodorkovsky had become the most independent 
businessman in the country. He created what others had failed to create: a transparent, Western-style-of-
management company which already had a positive international image ... and if 20% of this new company 
would have been sold to a Western company, the independence of Khodorkovsky from the authorities would 
have been fortified to a very great degree. And it's clear the authorities were not comfortable with that 
idea."  
Aleksei Kondaurov, Los Angeles Times December 19, 2004  
 
The lessons from the Yukos affair were immediately learned by other Russian oil 
companies. As one of the harshest critics of Khodorkovsky (William Browder, the head 
of the Hermitage Capital Mutual Fund in Russia) acknowledged in the aftermath of the 
Yukos affair: “… the threat of nationalization is forcing companies to go backward with their 
corporate governance.”2 Goriaev and Sonin (2006) document that investors perceived the 
attacks on YUKOS as a strong signal that the state would expropriate other companies 
as well. They show that the reaction to the Yukos affair was more negative for the stocks 
of more transparent companies than for those of less transparent ones. 
The Yukos affair was certainly not an isolated case and its relevance goes well 
beyond Russia. By studying 80 oil nationalizations that have occurred in 1955-2003 
around the world, Kolotilin (2007) shows that oil companies are more likely to be 
expropriated by governments in countries with imperfect institutions; the risk of 
nationalization is especially large when oil prices are high. Similar logic drove the 
famous expropriations of oil companies outside the 1959-2003 period: Expropiación 
Petrolera in Mexico in 1935, and recent nationalizations in Venezuela, Bolivia Ecuador, 
and Russia 
As shown in Figure 1, companies around the world respond to government 
predation with lower corporate transparency. In Figure 1, we plot country-level 
                                                 
2 Russia Profile Magazine, March 2007, p. 37, quoting William Browder. 
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differential opacity of firms that belong to the oil and gas extraction industry versus 
country predation index (both variables defined in detail later). The differential opacity 
is defined as country median opacity of firms that belong to the oil and gas industry 
minus country median opacity of all other firms. In most countries (26 out of 31), firms 
in the oil and gas industry are more opaque relative to all other firms (differential 
opacity is positive). More interestingly, differential opacity of oil and gas industries is 
generally larger in more predatory countries. The correlation coefficient between the two 
variables is 0.42 with p-value = 0.02. 
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Figure 1: Differential opacity of oil and gas extraction industries relative to other industries 
plotted against country predation index. Differential aggregate opacity is the difference between 
median opacity (across firms and years from 1990 through 2005) of firms that belong to industries 
with SIC = 13 (oil and gas extraction) and the median aggregate opacity of all other firms. Opacity 
is defined in Table II. The intercept and the slope of the line are determined by the following OLS 
regression: Differential opacity = -0.0198 + 0.00579 × Predation index (p-value = 0.02; R2 = 0.17; 
Number of countries = 31). 
 
 5 
In order to provide econometric support for our argument, we apply the approach 
introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) who studied the effect of financial dependence 
on growth. Rajan and Zingales ranked industries by the degree of financial dependence 
(using data from the U.S., arguably the most developed financial market) and then 
studied growth of industries in different countries depending on countries’ financial 
development and industries’ financial dependence. Similarly, we test whether the 
industries that are more vulnerable to government expropriation have lower 
transparency levels in countries with worse institutional development. Since we include 
both country and industry fixed effects in all our regressions, we essentially focus on a 
within-country variation in opacity induced by government rent-seeking.3 This 
approach mitigates the bias induced by endogeneity, omitted variables, and model 
misspecification.   
In order to conduct this test, we need proxies for opacity, oil price sensitivity, and 
government predation. Let us first describe our approach to measuring opacity. 
Managers can use different strategies to influence the accuracy of information about 
their company’s performance. Profitable firms may limit the amount of information 
disclosed in their financial statements or simply disclose false information (see, e.g., 
Schipper, 1989, Shivakumar, 2000, and Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley, 2007). Alternatively, 
the managers can manipulate the precision of information through trading (Aggarwal 
and Wu, 2006). For example, the managers can depress stock prices of a profitable 
company by placing a large sell order of the company’s stock. Furthermore, the 
managers can obfuscate company true prospects by passing false information to 
investors and market professionals. In measuring corporate opacity, we thus try to 
account for different ways that information disclosure can be manipulated. The analysis 
in our paper requires the construction of opacity measures which vary through time, so, 
we rely on firm accounting and market data that provide such variation. Our main 
variable is the aggregate opacity index, which consists of three components: accounting 
                                                 
3 This approach also helps us interpret the impact of political variables, such as party orientation. 
For example, the policies of left parties in developed countries may be less predatory than the 
policies of right parties in developing countries. This does not cause problems in our statistical 
analysis because we compare the impact of political variables on opacity within countries. 
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opacity, insider opacity, and informational opacity. The accounting opacity component 
reflects the quality of reported earnings in firms’ financial statements since managers 
often manage reported earnings to hide or obscure information. The second component 
of the opacity index, insider opacity, is based on a dynamic return-volume relationship, 
and it reflects the degree of informational asymmetry associated with a company. The 
third component, informational opacity, aims at tracking the aggregate amount of firm-
specific information contained in stock prices. The opacity variables are based on the 
accounting and financial data, and thus they do not reflect the exact mechanisms 
employed by the managers, but rather they can be viewed as aggregate opacity induced 
by information manipulation and withholding.4  
In order to find a proxy for the vulnerability of an industry to expropriation, we 
disentangle industry profitability into two parts: a part driven by luck such as by oil 
prices and a part determined by skill, such as managerial foresight or efficient 
operations. We conjecture that it is easier for governments to expropriate from a 
company whose profits are related more to exogenous economic conditions, such as 
high oil prices, rather than managers’ expertise or effort. Thus we use the sensitivity of 
industry profits with respect to oil prices as a proxy for the expropriation risk. To 
measure the sensitivity to oil prices, we use the U.S. data (and then exclude the U.S. 
from further tests). As a check for robustness, we also use a dummy variable for the oil 
and gas extraction industry to proxy for the risk of expropriation. We assume that 
expropriation risk is larger for firms that belong to this industry. 
We use three indices for countries’ degree of predation. First, we construct a 
predation index that encompasses information on countries’ rule of law, risk of 
government expropriation, corruption in the government, quality of bureaucracy, 
regulation of competition, etc. Second, we use the autocracy and democracy indices to 
measure the political constraints imposed on governments. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962), Botero et al. (2004), and Djankov et al. (2002) argue that members of autocratic 
                                                 
4 Using direct measures of information disclosure, such as the number of items disclosed in firms’ 
financial statements, is not suitable. There is no guarantee that companies disclose information 
truthfully.     
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governments are less constrained than the democratic ones, and thus they are more 
likely to pursue rent-seeking. Third, we apply information on party orientation of 
government chief executives (left versus right). Botero et al. (2002) find that political 
power of the leftist governments is associated with more redistributive policies at the 
expense of public companies.  
Our main empirical finding is that more expropriation-susceptible industries are less 
transparent when governments are more predatory. The adverse effect of predation is 
larger during periods of high oil prices or in countries abundant with oil reserves. We 
also observe that the constraints on chief government executives (measured by the 
degree of autocracy) and major party orientation (left versus right) matter. Specifically, 
opacity increases when a government is more autocratic or when it favors redistributive 
policies as measured by leftist party orientation. The opacity also increases during 
election years reflecting the increased uncertainty about future government policies.5 
Next, we turn our attention to the economic growth implications of lower 
transparency. Economic growth requires efficient allocation of capital. There is growing 
empirical evidence that more developed and more informational-rich financial markets 
are a necessary condition for efficient capital allocation (Durnev, Morck, Yeung (2004) 
and Wurgler, 2000). Following Wurgler (2000) we use the elasticity of investment with 
respect to value-added as a measure of capital allocation efficiency. Consistent with the 
resource curse argument, capital allocation is indeed less efficient in oil-sensitive 
industries located in countries with more predatory or autocratic governments. We also 
show that such industries grow slower. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents a simple model of disclosure under 
the threat of government’s expropriation and derives empirical predictions. In Section II, 
we describe the empirical methodology, the data, and the variables. Section III provides 
the analysis of how predation affects opacity of expropriation-vulnerable industries. 
Section IV presents capital allocation and industry growth results. In Section V, we 
                                                 
5 There might be a reverse causality problem between opacity and country predation. Using 
information on election years, which are exogenous in most countries, partially mitigates this 
concern. Dinç (2005) uses a similar approach to study the lending patterns of state-owned banks 
during election years. 
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discuss alternative interpretations of our findings and provide robustness checks.  In 
Section VI, we discuss related literature. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. A Model of Disclosure under Government Expropriation  
 To provide basic intuition behind our arguments, we present a stylized model of 
disclosure under a threat of government capture.  
 
A. The Setting 
We consider a simple illustrative model of disclosure along the lines of Verrecchia 
(2001). We assume that there is a distribution of firms, a government, and investors. 
Each firm has a project that generates earnings pi. The earnings pi are uniformly 
distributed on [ ]pipi,  so that the cumulative distribution function is F(pi)=(pi–pi)/( pi –pi). 
Each firm needs to raise I dollars to finance the project. Firms act in the interest of the 
original shareholders. 
Each firm may disclose its earnings at a fixed cost C. This cost covers the resources 
spent to verify the earnings to the outsiders, for example the cost of hiring auditors. 
Investors are perfectly competitive, their time preference is normalized to 1, and they 
price equity based on all relevant information. In particular, if the earnings pi are 
disclosed then the firm should issue I/pi shares to raise I dollars. If the earnings are not 
disclosed, investors calculate the expected earnings of the firm given the equilibrium 
decisions to disclose. For example, if investors know that all firms with pi>pi* disclose and 
others hide, the price of equity without disclosure is E(pi|pi<pi*)=(pi+pi*)/2. 
The government obtains the same information as the investors do. Government can 
expropriate a share x of the profits at a cost x2/(2P), where P is the proxy for the degree 
of predation for a given industry in a given country. The index P is high in industries 
and countries in which it is easier to expropriate firms’ profits. For example, in high- 
technology industries based on (inalienable) human capital, expropriation is costly (P is 
low); in natural resource industries, rents are easier to capture (P is high). Similarly, in 
countries where property rights are better protected, predation is lower (P is low).  
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We assume that P < 1/pi  so that the level of expropriation x is always between 0 and 
1. We also assume that technical costs of disclosure are sufficiently low, C + P pi  ( pi – pi) < 
I ( pi – pi) / ( pi +pi). It allows us to focus on the most interesting equilibrium, where some 
firms disclose in equilibrium and others do not.  
The timing is as follows. In period 0, firms learn their profits pi and choose whether 
to disclose. In period 1, investors observe the disclosed profits and buy the issued 
equity. The government observes the disclosed profits and chooses the level of 
expropriation x in period 2. In period 3, firms pay out dividends and get liquidated. 
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of the model.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model Timing 
 
B. Equilibrium and Model Predictions 
We consider the equilibrium where there exists such [ ]pipi∈pi ,*  that all firms with pi>pi* 
disclose and others hide. As we show later, the above assumptions imply that this 
equilibrium exists and there are no other equilibria. 
Let us first consider the firms that choose to disclose. If the government observes a 
disclosed pi, it chooses the level of expropriation x to maximize xpi – x2/(2P). The optimal 
expropriation is then x = piP. Similarly, investors observe disclosed earnings and 
therefore buy I/pi shares at the fair price pi. The firm’s payoff is then equal to 
 
– C + pi – xpi – piI/pi = – C + pi – Ppi2 – I .                                     (1) 
 
Now consider the firms that do not disclose. The government expects to get x E(pi|pi < pi*) 
– x2 / (2P). Therefore the level of expropriation is x = P E(pi|pi < pi*) = P (pi + pi*)/2. Investors 
also value these firms at E(pi|pi < pi*) = (pi + pi*)/2, so the firm issues 2I / (pi + pi*) shares. The 
Period 1: 
Investors buy 
issued shares. 
Period 2: 
Government observes 
disclosed profits and 
chooses to expropriate x. 
Period 3:  
Dividends are paid out;  
the firm is liquidated. 
Period 0: 
Firms learn earnings 
pi and choose 
whether to disclose. 
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firm’s payoff is therefore pi – pi P(pi + pi*)/2 – 2piI / (pi + pi*). Comparing the payoffs when 
firms disclose with profits when firms do not disclose, the cut-off equilibrium earnings 
pi* solve the following equation 
 
 C + Ppi*(pi* – pi) = I (pi* – pi) / (pi* + pi) .             (2) 
 
This equation has at most two roots pi* > pi, and the assumptions above assure that only 
the lower one lies below pi . 
Figure 3 illustrates the solution to (2); the figure plots the left- and right-hand sides 
of the equation (2) as a function of the share of firms that hide F(pi*)=(pi* – pi) / ( pi  -  pi) 
which is a linear transformation of pi*.  The left-hand side of the equation (2) is the cost of 
disclosure (technical costs C plus costs proportional to expropriation P). The right hand-
side captures the benefits of disclosure that are proportional to the need for external 
financing I. The cost curve is convex and starts at the point (0, C). The benefits curve is 
concave and goes through the points (0, 0) and (∞, I). 
 
Share of firms that hide 
pipi
pipi
−
−
*
 
Equilibrium F(pi*) 
1 
C 
Benefits of disclosure 
Costs of disclosure 
I 
Hide Disclose 
 11 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of equation (2). The “Cost of disclosure” it the left-hand side 
of the equation (2), and the “Benefits of disclosure” is its right-hand side of (2). 
 
Let us now study the effect of predation P and financial dependence I on the degree 
of opacity in the industry (proxied by the number of firms that hide F(pi*) ). Proposition 1 
describes the comparative statics. 
 
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions above there exists a unique equilibrium with the 
following properties. There is such [ ]pipi∈pi ,*  that pi* solves equation (2), all firms with pi > pi* 
disclose and all firms with pi ≤ pi* hide. The equilibrium has the following comparative statics: the 
level of opacity F(pi*) increases in predation cost P, cost of disclosure C and decreases in external 
financing needs I. Moreover, the effect of predation P on opacity F(pi*) decreases in I. If both pi  
and pi increase by the same amount, opacity increases. 
 
The Proposition is intuitive and can be understood in terms of Figure 3. Indeed, as 
the level of predation P or the technical cost of disclosure C increase, the costs of 
disclosure curve shifts up, the equilibrium level of pi* goes up, and opacity increases. As 
the financial dependence I increases, the benefits curve moves up, equilibrium pi* goes 
down and opacity decreases.   
The interaction between the effects of the financial dependence I and of predation P 
is also clear: if P increases, the effect of P on opacity pi* is large whenever the “benefits of 
disclosure” curve lies low (low I). 
The last result helps us understand the effect of oil price on the oil industry and 
other oil-dependent industries. If a positive shock uniformly raises profits of all firms in 
the industry, the government has stronger incentives to expropriate, and firms respond 
by becoming more opaque. Indeed, if both pi  and pi increase by the same amount, the 
cost of disclosure goes up and benefits of disclosure go down, so the equilibrium level of 
opacity F(pi*) increases. 
Based on Proposition 1, we obtain the following empirical predictions. Industries 
that are more vulnerable to government expropriation are more opaque while the 
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industries that are more financially-dependent should be more transparent. The effect of 
government expropriation on opaqueness should be especially strong in the industries 
that are less financially dependent.  Most importantly, a positive profit shock (such as a 
higher oil price for oil-dependent industries) results in a higher expropriation risk and 
therefore lower transparency. 
 
III. Empirical Setup and Variables 
 
A. Empirical Specifications   
A simple cross-sectional comparison of the opacity levels across industries or countries 
would suffer from a number of econometric problems, such as omitted variables, model 
misspecification, and endogeneity. To test our hypotheses, we apply the methodology 
similar to that in Rajan and Zingales (1998) using a panel of industry-country-year data. 
The regressions include interaction effects between industrial vulnerability to 
expropriation, proxies for government predation in a given country, oil prices or country 
oil reserves, and fixed effects for industries, countries, and years. The main advantage of 
this methodology is that by controlling for country, industry, and time fixed effects, we 
mitigate the problem of omitted variables bias or model specification, which can afflict 
cross-country or cross-industry regressions. Essentially, we make predictions about 
within-country, across-industries, and through-time differences in industry opacity 
levels based on interactions between industry risk of expropriation, country oil price, 
and country proxies for predation.  
Our basic regressions are as follows: 
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where j indexes industries, c indexes countries, and t indexes time. All regressions 
include industry fixed effects (αj), country fixed effects (δc), and year fixed effects (ηt). 
The dependent variable, c
tjOPACITY , , is opacity of industry j from country c in year t.  
The independent variables include a triple interaction term between industry 
expropriation vulnerability, oil price-dependency, the natural log of oil price, and 
predation index ( c
tttj PREDATIONPRICEOILEXPR ×× _, ). After controlling for fixed effects, 
the main coefficient of interest coefficient (β1) measures the incremental increase in 
opacity given a unit increase in expropriation risk, the change in oil price and country 
predation. Our model in the previous section implies that the risk of expropriation is 
higher when government is predatory (higher c
tPREDATION , a proxy for P), and when 
the corporate profits or rents are high (higher 
ttj PRICEOILEXPR _, × , a proxy for an 
upward shift in both  pi  and pi ); therefore the coefficient  β1  should be positive and 
significant.6  
The double interaction effects (
ttj PRICEOILEXPR _, × , cttj PREDATIONEXPR ×, , and 
c
tt PREDATIONPRICEOIL ×_ ), and 
c
tPREDATION  are also controlled for to account for 
independent effects of these measures on opacity. Control variables include the need for 
external financing (
tjFINEXT ,_ ) and the interaction term of the need for external 
financing with predation ( c
ttj PREDATIONFINEXT ×,_ ). 
As oil price is the same for all countries and industries in a given year, it may 
capture the effect of the time dummies. In order to check for robustness, we include year 
fixed effects and replace oil price with country oil reserves. Unlike oil price, oil reserves 
are country- and year-specific. As oil reserves are measured as economically relevant 
proven reserves, this variable is a good proxy for the expected Net Present Value of 
future rents given the prevailing technology and oil price. Therefore, oil reserves also 
capture corporate rents in oil industry and oil-dependent industries; our model implies 
that oil dependent industries should be less transparent in countries with predatory 
governments and greater oil reserves.  
                                                 
6
 We replace the predation index with the autocracy variable in some of the specifications. 
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To investigate the impact of party orientation and the effect of elections we run a 
similar regression to (3) but include the left party dummy ( c
tL ) or elections time dummy 
(these variables are defined later) instead of the predation index.  
Thus we run, 
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Regressions (3) and (4) are run on a sample of 72 2-digit SIC industries and 16 years 
from 49 countries. Since some of the variables are calculated using the U.S. data, we 
drop the U.S. from our analysis.  
 
B. Industry Risk of Expropriation 
The main variable in our study is the risk of expropriation. We proxy for the risk of 
government expropriation by industry profits dependency on oil price. Our underlying 
premise is that the risk of government expropriation is higher for industries whose 
profits are driven more by luck (high prices of oil) rather than managerial skill or effort. 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) use a similar argument to differentiate between 
managerial luck and skill in a study of CEOs compensation.7  
We define industry oil price-dependency as the coefficient 2SICβ on the natural 
logarithm of oil price in a regression of industry inflation-adjusted valuation on time 
trend and log of real oil price,  
 
                                                 
7 Other papers use an increase in oil price as an exogenous shock to industry profitability. For 
example, Lamont (1987) studies the relation between investment and cash flow by employing the 
1982 oil shock. He observes that, on average, non-oil divisions of oil firms experienced a larger 
drop in investment than non-oil firms. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007) use the relation between 
industry profits and oil price to address endogeneity between corporate governance and 
performance. 
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( ) 22222 ln SICtoiltSICSICSICSICt PtQ µβα +++=  ,           (5) 
 
where Q is the median firm valuation (inflation-adjusted) in an industry, α is a constant, 
t is the time trend, Poil is inflation-adjusted price of oil, and µ is the error term. 
Regression (5) is estimated for every 2-digit SIC industry using a sample of U.S. publicly 
listed firms from COMPUSTAT tapes from 1950 through 2005. The firm valuation is 
defined as the sum of firm market value (COMPUSTAT item #199 times #25), total assets 
(#6) minus firm book value of equity (#60) over firm total assets.8 We rely on U.S. firms 
rather than local firms to mitigate the impact of country characteristics on profitability of 
local industries. For example, if we estimated regression (5) using valuation data from 
local markets, the estimated coefficients would not represent true oil dependency 
because firms might misrepresent corporate profits in fear of expropriation.  
Oil prices (in U.S. dollars) are obtained from the International Finance Statistics (IFS) 
available through the International Monetary Fund. We inflation-adjust oil prices by 
dividing the series by the U.S. Purchasing Price Index from the IFS. Figure 4 depict the 
time-series of oil price expressed in U.S. 2005 dollars per barrel. 
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8 An augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root in firm valuation and log 
of oil price series. 
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Figure 4: Oil prices dynamics expressed in 2005 U.S. dollars per barrel. Dollar oil prices and 
Purchasing Price Index are from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics Dataset. 
 
Figure 5 plots industry oil price-dependency for 72 two-digit SIC U.S. industries. The 
majority of industries (56 out of 72) show negative oil price sensitivities. Industries that 
rely on oil and other natural resources as a major production input exhibit negative 
sensitivities (especially “Petroleum Refining” and “Transportation Services”). As 
expected, industries whose major output is natural resources have positive sensitivities 
(“Mining of Minerals”, “Coal Mining”, “Oil and Gas Extraction”).  
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Figure 5: Industry oil price-dependency of U.S. industries. Industry oil price-dependency is 
defined as the coefficient on the log of inflation-adjusted oil price of an industry-specific 
regression of median industry valuation (Q) on a constant (α), a time trend (t) and the log of oil 
price (P) run using all firms in COMPUSTAT during the time period from 1950 through 2005. The 
regression is ( ) 22222 ln SICtoiltSICSICSICSICt PtQ µβα +++= . 
 
To check for robustness, we substitute the oil dependency variable with the oil and 
gas extraction industry dummy variable which takes a value of one for industries that 
belong to oil and gas extraction sector (SIC code = 13) and zero otherwise. This industry 
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includes companies primarily engaged in: (1) producing crude petroleum and natural 
gas; (2) extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale; (3) producing natural gasoline and 
cycle condensate; and (4) producing gas and hydrocarbon liquids from coal at the mine 
site.   
We provide evidence that oil price-dependency and oil industry dummy are 
reasonable proxies for the risk of expropriation. Using historical data on expropriations 
around the world (1955-2003) we confirm that more oil price-dependent industries have 
experienced more instances of expropriation. Figure 6 utilizes Kolotilin’s (2007) data 
(which, in turn, is based on the dataset of nationalizations in Kobrin, 1980, 1984) and 
depicts the relation between the total number of expropriations of foreign companies 
(grouped by major industries) and oil price-dependency. Expropriation is defined as a 
forced divestment of foreign property, and includes formal expropriation, extra-legal 
forced transfer of ownership, forced sale, and revision of contractual agreements using 
the coercive power of the government. The largest number of expropriations has been in 
the petroleum industry (98) followed by manufacturing (98), and mining (55). The 
number of expropriation instances in services, construction, and media are the lowest: 
12, 8, and 3, respectively.  Furthermore, it is evident that more oil price-dependent 
industries had more expropriations during 1955-2003.   
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Figure 6. Number of nationalizations by industry (1955-1990 total) and industry oil 
dependency. Nationalizations are defined as forced divestment of foreign property. Industry oil 
price-dependency is defined as the coefficient on the log of inflation-adjusted oil price of an 
industry-specific regression of median industry valuation (Q) on a constant (α), a time trend (t) 
and the log of oil price (P) run using all firms in COMPUSTAT during the time period from 1950 
through 2005. The regression is ( ) 22222 ln SICtoiltSICSICSICSICt PtQ µβα +++= . The intercept and the slope 
of the line are determined by the following OLS regression: Number of expropriation instances 
=132.1 + 48.6 × Industry oil price-dependency (p-value = 0.00; R2 = 0.08; Number of industries = 13).   
 
Figure 7 depicts the total number of expropriations of foreign companies in the oil 
extraction industry plotted against country autocracy index. There is a clear positive 
relation between the two; countries with more autocratic governments had more 
expropriations during 1955-2003.  
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Figure 7. Number of nationalizations in the oil extraction industry (1955-2003 total) and 
autocracy. Nationalizations are defined as forced divestment of foreign property. Country 
autocracy (defined later) measures the degree of closedness of political institutions. The intercept 
and the slope of the line are determined by the following OLS regression: Number of 
expropriation instances = 0.0673 + 0.0525 × Country autocracy (p-value = 0.00; R2 = 0.08; Number of 
countries = 129).   
 
Country oil reserves and the volume of oil production are from the 2007 BP 
Statistical Review. They are depicted in Figure 6. In our sample of 51 countries, Russia, 
Venezuela, Mexico and the U.S. had the largest oil reserves. Russia, Venezuela, the U.S., 
and China had the largest volume of oil production. Both oil reserves and oil production 
are endogenous to the price of oil. As oil becomes more expensive, oil reserves and oil 
production increase too as it becomes more profitable to fund oil exploration and 
extraction. Moreover, as the data on oil reserves include the economically relevant 
reserves, the reserves vary over time both due to exploration/depletion and due to 
change in the price of oil.  
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Figure 8. Country statistics on oil reserves in tens of millions of barrels and oil productions in 
thousands of barrels (daily), average 1990-2005. Countries are sorted according to the oil 
reserves. Source: 2007 BP Statistical Review. 
 
C. Opacity Index 
The aggregate opacity index consists of three components. The first one, accounting opacity, 
measures reported earnings quality. The second component, insider opacity, reflects 
information asymmetry about a firm. Finally, informational opacity reflects the amount of 
firm-specific information incorporated into stock prices. These variables are calculated 
for every firm present in the Worldscope and Datastream databases from 1990 through 
2005. Our initial sample consists of 29,926 firms from 51 countries.  
 
C.1 Accounting opacity calculated as quality of earnings reports 
Our first measure of opacity – accounting opacity – is based on the quality of earnings 
reported in firms’ financial statements. In line with Schipper (1989), Shivakumar (2000), 
and Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2007), earnings management is often used by 
managers to obscure information about a company’s operating performance. 
Specifically, Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2007) provide empirical evidence that 
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politically-connected firms are under lower pressure to disclose truthful information 
and thus have lower quality of reported earnings.  
To construct the accounting opacity we follow Dechow (1994), Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney (1995), and Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2007) and measure firm earnings 
opacity as a deviation of reported accruals from a benchmark of accounting accruals. We 
use a country benchmark as in Chaney, Faccio, and Parsley (2007) and estimate a panel 
time-series, cross-country regression using 1990-2005 data from Worldscope, 
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where ∆ is the difference operator, c indexes countries, i indexes firms, and t indexes 
years. Total current accruals, TCA, are defined as ∆(Current Assets) – ∆(Current Liabilities) 
– ∆ (Cash) + ∆ (Short-term and Current Long-term Debt); A is total assets, Sales is total sales, 
PP&E is the sum of net property, plant, and equipment, and accumulated reserves for 
depreciation, depletion and amortization. Dj are two-digit SIC industry fixed effects and 
Dτ are year fixed effects. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
The accounting opacity for firm i in country j is defined as the standard deviation of 
the error term of the above regression calculated over 1990-2005. Firms that have fewer 
than 5 observations are dropped from the sample. We assign a 2-digit SIC industry code 
to every company and take industry medians for industry equivalents of the firm-level 
measures.  
 
C.2 Insider opacity calculated as returns autocorrelation conditional on trading volume 
We construct the second constituent of opacity, insider opacity, to capture the aggregate 
level of information asymmetry about a company. We use a measure developed by 
Llorente et al. (2002), which is based on stock return autocorrelation conditional on 
trading volume. They consider an economy with risk-averse investors and three types of 
assets: a riskless bond, a risky stock, and a non-traded asset. The stock’s dividend is 
correlated with the payoff of the non-traded asset. Since the return of the stock and the 
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non-traded asset are correlated, as the holdings of the non-traded asset change, the 
investors want to adjust their stock positions to maintain an optimal risk exposure. 
There are two groups of investors with the first group (insiders) having more precise 
information about the stock’s pay-off. This information asymmetry gives rise to trading 
on private information. Llorente et al. argue that when a subset of investors sells a stock 
for hedging reasons the stock’s price must decrease to attract other investors to buy. 
Since the expectation of future stock payoff remains the same, the decrease in the price 
causes a low return in the current period and a high expected return for the next period. 
When a subset of investors sells a stock on private information, the stock price decreases 
reflecting the negative private information about its future payoff. Since this information 
is usually partially impounded into the price, the low return in the current period is 
followed by a low return in the next period, when the negative private information is 
further reflected in price.  
The authors argue that during periods of intense trading volume, hedging trades 
generate negatively autocorrelated returns, and private information trades generate 
positively autocorrelated returns. The greater the information asymmetry between the 
two groups of traders, the more likely it is that returns are positively autocorrelated 
(conditional on trading volume). Their model suggests the following relation between 
returns and trading volume,  
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where Ri,t is the return for company i in period t, and Vi,t is trading volume. They argue 
that C2 is more positive when information asymmetry about a company is high.  
 We define insider opacity as the coefficient C2 in the time-series regression,  
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run for each firm i in country c during year t using at least 30 weeks of trading data from 
1990 through 2005. In the above regression, A is the intercept, C1, C2 are the regression 
coefficients, and ε is the error term. In equation (8) return Ri,t is defined as, 
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where Pi,t is the weekly closing price, and Di,t is dividends per share. Trading volume, 
Vi,t, is calculated as de-trended volume, 
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where VOL is the number of shares traded, and N is the number of shares outstanding. 
We obtain daily closing prices, numbers of shares traded, and the number of shares 
outstanding from Datastream, and dividends per share from Worldscope.9 All variables 
are measured in U.S. dollars. We aggregate this variable by taking 2-digit SIC code 
industry medians.   
There is ample empirical evidence that coefficient C2 is related to other measures of 
information asymmetry. Specifically, Llorente et. al. verify that C2 is positive (negative) 
for companies that are more (less) likely to suffer from information asymmetry – that is, 
firms with high (low) bid-ask spread, small (large) size, and/or with fewer (more) 
analysts following. In a supportive study, Grishchenko, Litov, and Mei (2003) show that 
C2 is, on average, larger for firms that are located in countries where information 
                                                 
9 Coefficient C2 can be contaminated by several data and econometric specification problems, 
such as autocorrelated errors, differences in the measurement period, and the effect of firm-
specific private information versus market-wide information. Since the estimated coefficient can 
be affected by autocorrelated errors we repeat the regressions using an appropriate 
autoregressive structure, based on Breusch and Pagan (1980) test. Moreover, it is likely that 
private information trading is affected by information about firm-specific factors rather than 
information about market-wide factors. Therefore, we re-estimate (8) after deducting local stock 
markets’ factors from returns and volume. Our main results are robust to these modifications. 
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asymmetry problems are more severe, such as countries with poor disclosure 
requirements or countries that have weak corporate governance. This variable is also 
used by Fernandes and Ferreira (2006) for international firms to measure the amount of 
private information trading caused by information asymmetry between traders. In a 
recent paper, Gagnon, Karolyi, and Lee (2007) confirm that C2 is smaller for firms in 
countries with more transparent stock markets.   
 
C.3 Informational opacity measure calculated as returns synchronicity 
As a final component of opacity, we use a measure of information-based trading 
measured by the degree of stock prices asynchronicity developed in Morck, Yeung, and 
Yu (2000). Intuitively, if a firm’s stock return is highly correlated with the market factor 
then the stock return is less likely to contain firm-specific information. On the other 
hand, if the stock return moves asynchronously with the market return, it is indicative of 
more firm-specific information impounded into stock prices. 
We calculate stock returns asynchronicity as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) by  
decomposing the variation in local individual stock returns into two components: 
unexplained (residual) sum of squares and explained (by local market index and U.S. 
index) sum of squares. To perform the decomposition we first run the following 
regression, 
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where ctir ,  is firm i’s weekly return, 
c
tmr ,  is a value-weighted local market return, and 
US
tmr ,  
is a value-weighted market return in the U.S. All returns are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
Local market and U.S. indices exclude the firm in question to avoid spurious correlation 
between individual returns and indices for markets with few firms. We define 
informational opacity as the logarithmic transformation of one minus the coefficient of 
determination of the above regression, ( ))/(ln ,, cici RR 22 1 − , which is, by construction, 
equal to the difference between the logs of unexplained and explained sums of squares. 
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High values of informational opacity mean that individual stock returns move more 
synchronously with local and U.S. market indexes which reflects less informative (in 
terms of firm-specific information) stock prices. To mitigate the impact of outliers we 
winsorize the three opacity measures at the 1% and 90% levels. Firm observations are 
again aggregated to 2-digit SIC code industries. 
 
C.4 Aggregate opacity index 
The above methodologies result in three indexes of opacity. To isolate the common 
component of the cross-section of each index, we use the principal component analysis 
using one factor. Every loading of the principal component enters with the positive sign 
reflecting the fact that the three measures are positively correlated. The loadings are 
0.550 for accounting opacity, 0.526 for insider opacity, 0.649 for informational opacity.  
 
D. External Financing Need 
We calculate our main control variable, the external financing need, as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998).  It is defined as the industry median value (over 1990-2005) of capital 
expenditures (COMPUSTAT #128) minus cash flows from operations (#123 + #125 + #126 
+ #106 + #213 +#217) divided by capital expenditures. This variable is calculated at the 2-
digit SIC industry level using the sample of all U.S. firms included in COMPUSTAT. It is 
then matched (by 2-digit SIC code) with non-U.S. industries from our international 
sample. This approach assumes that U.S. capital markets are frictionless and that non-
U.S. firms have similar external financing needs as the U.S. firms in the same industry.  
 
E. Predation, Autocracy Indexes, Party Orientation, and Elections 
Individual indexes of institutional development are known to be highly correlated and 
using them in one regression causes multicollinearity. To address this problem, we 
extract the first principal component from several individual proxies.  
Our predation index consists of the following attributes: (i) corruption in government; 
(ii) risk of government expropriation; (iii) lack of property rights protection; (iv) rule of 
law (assessment of law and order tradition in a country); (v) government stance towards 
 26 
business (assessment of the likelihood that the current government will implement 
business-unfriendly policies); (vi) freedom to compete (assessment of government 
policies towards establishing a competitive market environment); (v) quality of 
bureaucracy (assessment of whether bureaucracy impedes fair business practices); and 
(viii) impact of crime (assessment of whether crime impedes private businesses 
development). The corruption and the rule of law indices are obtained from 
Transparency International (TI), while the rest of the indices come from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). The loadings for the predation index are as follows: 0.344 for the 
corruption index; 0.353 for the risk of government expropriation; 0.372 for the lack of 
property rights protection index; 0.366 for the rule of law index; 0.353 for the 
government stance towards business index; 0.349 for the freedom to compete index; 
0.370 for the quality of bureaucracy index; and 0.319 for the impact of crime index.10   
To measure political constraints on chief executives in the government we use 
democracy and autocracy indices compiled by a well-known political data set, POLITY 
IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2006). The autocracy index is calculated as POLITY’s 
“autocratic government” variable minus POLITY’s “democratic government” variable.11 
The “autocratic government” variable measures general closedness of political 
institutions. The “democratic government” measures general openness of political 
institutions.12 The two variables assess a number of factors, such as (i) competitiveness of 
political participation; (ii) regulation of participation; (iii) the openness and 
competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (iv) constraints on the chief executive.   
We rely on the World Bank’s database on political institutions compiled by Beck et 
al. (2001) to define main party orientation and election years. The data are cross-checked 
                                                 
10 We multiply this index by -1 and add a constant equal to the maximum value of the index so 
that larger values of the index represent greater predation. 
11 We add a constant of value 10 to the score to change the scaling from -10-to-10 to 0-to-20. 
Furthermore, this variable is available for the time period from 1990 through 2003. It is available 
for all countries, except for Hong Kong. 
12 As a robustness check we use the “proportional representation of votes” index and the 
“divided government” index. The “proportional representation of votes” takes a value of one if 
legislatures were elected based on the percentage of votes received by their party and zero 
otherwise. The ““divided government” is the probability that two random chosen deputies 
belong to a different party in a given year.  
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using a number of sources: Journal of Democracy, Elections around the World 
(http://www.electionworld.org/), Election Guide (http://www.electionguide.org/), and 
CIA Factbook. The party orientation (left, right, or center) is defined as the party of chief 
executive. The election year is defined as the year of executive election, which is the year 
of parliamentary election for a parliamentary system or an assembly-elected presidential 
system and the year of presidential election for a presidential system. We single out 
those election years during which the party orientation changed from right to left.13 
Table I contains information on various country’s political systems (presidential or 
parliamentary), chief executive’s party type (left, right, or center), and election dates of 
government executives.  
 
F. Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Table II describes the variables in this study. Table III presents summary statistics for 
industry oil price-dependency, the accounting opacity index and its components. Table 
IV contains country variables: the predation index, the autocracy index, GDP per capita, 
oil reserves, and oil production.  
Table V reports correlation coefficients between main variables. All three 
components of the opacity index are positively and significantly correlated among each 
other and with the aggregate opacity index. Across the sample countries, more oil-
dependent industries are less transparent. Oil price-dependency is negatively related to 
three out of four opacity measures. The correlation coefficient is significant only for the 
informational opacity.14 Firms in countries with more predatory or autocratic 
governments are generally more opaque. Predation index is positively and significantly 
correlated with the accounting opacity, informational opacity, and aggregate opacity. 
Insider opacity is significantly higher in more autocratic countries. More economically- 
developed countries (as measured by GDP per capita) have significantly lower levels of 
predation and autocracy. Corporations located in countries richer in natural resources 
                                                 
13 We assume that managers and investors face uncertainty about future elections outcomes. 
14 In Table V, we do not report the correlation coefficients between the industry oil price-
dependency and country measures because it does not change across countries.   
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(as measured by oil reserves) have greater opacity. Moreover, these countries tend to be 
more predatory and autocratic.  
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Table VI 
Oil price-dependency, opacity, and predation. 
Regressions of industry opacity on interactions of oil price-dependency with oil price or country oil reserves, and predation including country, industry, 
and year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of aggregate opacity (Panel A) and its components: accounting opacity (Panel B), insider opacity (Panel B), and informational transparency (Panel C). 
The independent variables are: interaction term of industry oil price-dependency with the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves and country predation; industry oil price-dependency with 
the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves; industry oil price-dependency with predation; the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves with predation; industry external financing needs 
with predation; oil reserves, predation, and external financing needs. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. All regression coefficients are multiplied by 10. Numbers in 
parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. 
Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. The variables are defined in Table II.  
 
country variable PREDATION 
dependent variable A: aggregate opacity B: accounting opacity C: insider opacity D: informational opacity 
oil price or oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves 
oil price-dependency × oil price or reserves × predation 0.78149 0.01371 0.05539 0.01186 0.16686 0.00986 0.08185 0.00500 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) 
oil price-dependency × oil price or reserves 2.30875 0.02104 -0.12904 -0.05928 0.69213 0.02358 1.21354 0.01245 
  (0.16) (0.69) (0.84) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.37) 
oil price-dependency × predation 2.23287 0.33894 -0.48103 0.25477 0.54463 0.00105 0.39114 0.04574 
  (0.10) (0.07) (0.49) (0.00) (0.01) (0.97) (0.76) (0.01) 
oil price or reserves × predation -0.05467 0.06118 -0.01222 -0.00154 0.01732 -0.00061 0.21017 0.37753 
  (0.65) (0.00) (0.80) (0.41) (0.30) (0.73) (0.03) (0.00) 
oil reserves - -0.16691 - -0.00553 - 0.000396 - 0.06902 
    (0.00)   (0.65)   (0.61)   (0.00) 
predation 0.61104 -0.08432 0.15527 0.11258 -0.02238 0.03801 0.81303 0.23274 
  (0.61) (0.61) (0.37) (0.02) (0.72) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) 
need for external financing × predation -1.14139 4.34023 0.46583 0.46254 -0.02238 0.34181 0.44455 0.34554 
  (0.00) (0.12) (0.40) (0.40) (0.72) (0.18) (0.09) (0.23) 
need for external financing -0.62168 -1.20496 -2.21543 -0.81702 -0.70373 -0.07514 0.06893 -1.67021 
  (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.97) (0.06) 
industry fixed effects included included included included included Included included included 
country fixed effects included included included included included Included included included 
year fixed effects included included included included included Included included included 
R2 0.352 0.360 0.548 0.567 0.196 0.201 0.325 0.332 
number of observations 20,978 20,111 23,076 22,168 23,787 22,649 25,461 24,272 
number of industries 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
number of countries 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
number of years 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Table VII 
Oil price-dependency, opacity, and autocracy. 
Regressions of industry opacity on interactions of oil price-dependency with oil price or country oil reserves, and autocracy including country, industry, and 
year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of aggregate opacity (Panel A) and its components: accounting opacity (Panel B); insider opacity (Panel B), and informational transparency (Panel C). The 
independent variables are: interaction term of industry oil price-dependency with the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves and country autocracy; industry oil price-dependency with the natural log 
of oil price or country oil reserves; industry oil price-dependency with autocracy; the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves with autocracy; industry external financing needs with autocracy; oil 
reserves, autocracy, and external financing needs. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. All regression coefficients are multiplied by 10. Numbers in parentheses are probability 
levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from 
the sample. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
country variable AUTOCRACY 
dependent variable A: aggregate opacity B: accounting opacity C: insider opacity D: informational opacity 
 oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves 
oil price-dependency × oil price or oil reserves × autocracy -0.10534 0.01704 0.01636 0.00747 -0.01325 0.00071 0.03011 0.01191 
  (0.67) (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.73) (0.60) (0.10) (0.10) 
oil price-dependency × oil price or oil reserves 3.60500 0.03586 0.12357 -0.03123 0.20514 0.00949 0.36038 -0.11514 
  (0.70) (0.00) (0.80) (0.03) (0.28) (0.15) (0.74) (0.00) 
oil price-dependency × autocracy 0.06352 0.03586 -0.11808 0.00751 0.03106 -0.00272 0.80452 -0.11514 
  (0.94) (0.67) (0.58) (0.76) (0.80) (0.85) (0.26) (0.69) 
oil price or oil reserves × autocracy 0.09103 0.02048 -0.00397 0.00751 -0.00578 0.00025 0.09383 0.01673 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.09) (0.01) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) 
oil reserves - -0.14936 - -0.02840 - 0.00144 - 0.14425 
    (0.00)   (0.08)   (0.86)   (0.00) 
autocracy 0.28335 -0.11345 0.16243 0.01241 0.05527 0.07720 0.29079 0.27756 
  (0.09) (0.45) (0.00) (0.79) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) 
need for external financing × autocracy -1.35019 -2.94771 -0.91300 -0.12494 0.06257 -0.48934 0.38884 -0.25687 
  (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.83) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18) (0.87) 
need for external financing -0.26873 -0.81162 -2.27282 -0.12800 -0.66905 -0.01462 -0.75443 -0.618627 
  (0.90) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.53) (0.65) (0.00) 
industry fixed effects included Included Included included included included included included 
country fixed effects included Included Included included included included included included 
year fixed effects included Included Included included included included included included 
R2 0.333 0.361 0.561 0.561 0.200 0.201 0.333 0.337 
number of observations 18,324 18,221 20,343 20,204 20,722 20,461 22,406 22,073 
number of industries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
number of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
number of years 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Table VIII 
Oil price-dependency, opacity, and party orientation. 
Regressions of industry opacity on interactions of oil price-dependency with oil price or country oil reserves, and left party type dummy variable including 
country, industry, and year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of aggregate opacity (Panel A) and its components: accounting opacity (Panel B); insider opacity (Panel B), and informational transparency (Panel C). 
The independent variables are: interaction term of industry oil price-dependency with the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves and left party dummy; industry oil price-dependency with the 
natural log of oil price or country oil reserves; industry oil price-dependency with left party dummy; the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves with left party dummy; industry external 
financing needs with left party dummy; oil reserves, left party dummy, and external financing needs. Left party dummy takes a value of one if the party of the government chief executive is classified 
as left and zero otherwise. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. All regression coefficients are multiplied by 10. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the 
hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. 
The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
country variable PARTY ORIENTATION 
dependent variable A: aggregate opacity B: accounting opacity C: insider opacity D: informational opacity 
oil price or oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves 
oil price-dependency × oil price or oil reserves × left 0.50532 0.22936 0.96287 0.18807 0.03100 0.01398 0.38846 0.14349 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.24) (0.23) (0.01) (0.01) 
oil price-dependency × oil price or oil reserves 0.12691 0.03723 -0.55562 -0.0168 2.3008 0.0063 5.2626 -0.9984 
  (0.94) (0.26) (0.31) (0.79) (0.35) (0.89) (0.70) (0.00) 
oil price-dependency × left 6.01218 1.93655 -3.06417 0.73237 1.01711 0.04473 5.89782 -0.63452 
  (0.40) (0.01) (0.22) (0.00) (0.36) (0.72) (0.35) (0.20) 
oil price or oil reserves × left -0.04565 -0.15576 0.07223 -0.02094 0.01379 -0.00698 0.30152 0.15211 
  (0.68) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.42) (0.26) (0.00) (0.01) 
oil reserves - 0.22118 - -0.00732 - 0.01799 - -0.19315 
    (0.00)   (0.36)   (0.05)   (0.04) 
left -0.37911 -0.36557 0.01395 -0.01195 0.06544 -0.06510 -0.16139 0.13164 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.74) (0.46) (0.01) (0.13) (0.21) (0.73) 
need for external financing × left -2.21911 -2.75217 -1.06724 -0.49429 -0.10211 -0.39990 1.54538 -1.44806 
  (0.13) (0.15) (0.04) (0.11) (0.65) (0.33) (0.22) (0.43) 
need for external financing -2.00272 -1.30471 0.09632 0.16522 -0.28564 0.07078 -0.76748 3.69231 
  (0.32) (0.17) (0.88) (0.48) (0.33) (0.69) (0.63) (0.09) 
industry fixed effects included included Included included included included included included 
country fixed effects included included Included included included included included included 
year fixed effects included included Included included included included included included 
R2 0.370 0.371 0.564 0.567 0.200 0.201 0.3384 0.3424 
number of observations 18,253 18,149 20,277 20,138 20,409 20,409 22,350 22,022 
number of industries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
number of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
number of years 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
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Table IX 
Oil price-dependency, opacity, and elections. 
Regressions of industry opacity on interactions of oil-dependency with oil price or country oil reserves, and elections conditional on party change including 
country, industry, and year fixed effects, and with robust standard errors. 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of aggregate opacity (Panel A) and its components: accounting opacity (Panel B); insider opacity (Panel B), and informational transparency (Panel C). The 
independent variables are: interaction term of industry oil price-dependency with the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves and election year conditional on party orientation change (from right to left); 
industry oil price-dependency with the natural log of oil price or country oil reserves; industry oil price-dependency with election year conditional on party orientation change (from right to left); the natural 
log of oil price or country oil reserves with election year conditional on party orientation change (from right to left); industry external financing needs with election year conditional on party orientation change 
(from right to left); oil reserves, election year conditional on party orientation change (from right to left), and external financing needs. Election year conditional on party orientation change dummy takes a 
value of one for the election year during which the party orientation changed from right to left and zero otherwise. All regressions include industry, country, and year fixed effects. All regression coefficients 
are multiplied by 10. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher 
are in bold face. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
 
 
country variable ELECTION YEAR 
dependent variable A: aggregate opacity B: accounting opacity C: insider opacity D: informational opacity 
oil price or oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves oil price  oil reserves 
oil price-dependency ×  oil price or oil reserves × election year 0.52344 0.70876 4.90856 0.11307 1.64521 0.08910 32.97409 0.40218 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.77) (0.33) (0.05) (0.03) 
oil price-dependency ×  oil price or oil reserves 0.02944 -0.70876 -0.05608 -0.05531 0.17142 0.00617 0.72444 -0.06932 
  (0.98) (0.85) (0.88) (0.00) (0.23) (0.17) (0.39) (0.01) 
oil price-dependency × election year 45.28517 4.64938 -4.94711 0.52687 15.07827 0.16509 105.89600 4.97485 
  (0.52) (0.01) (0.79) (0.60) (0.14) (0.58) (0.10) (0.01) 
oil price or oil reserves × election year -0.60503 0.09306 -0.12577 -0.03857 -0.02127 0.00521 0.09744 -0.05198 
  (0.09) (0.63) (0.38) (0.41) (0.67) (0.75) (0.75) (0.62) 
oil reserves - 0.04796 - -0.00444 - 0.00638 - -0.00977 
  
 (0.27)   (0.73)   (0.22)   (0.74) 
election year 0.29242 -0.28635 0.01102 -0.01256 0.05743 -0.05938 -0.04633 0.01114 
  (0.03) (0.33) (0.78) (0.75) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.93) 
need for external financing × election year -9.14111 -4.30544 1.91361 -0.38839 0.24002 -0.33930 -2.41042 1.77011 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.39) (0.48) (0.69) (0.18) (0.51) (0.21) 
need for external financing -4.32106 1.47189 -0.43506 0.74080 -0.37449 -0.06773 1.55966 -1.29019 
  (0.01) (0.55) (0.42) (0.53) (0.13) (0.83) (0.26) (0.52) 
industry fixed effects Included Included Included included included included included included 
country fixed effects Included Included Included included included included included included 
year fixed effects Included Included Included included included included included included 
R2 0.358 0.358 0.545 0.565 0.198 0.197 0.330 0.330 
number of observations 20,111 20,111 23,076 22,168 22,649 22,649 24,272 24,272 
number of industries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
number of countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
number of years 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
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IV. Impact of Autocracy, Predation, and Political Cycles on Opacity of 
Oil-price Dependent Industries 
In this section, we test our main prediction: industries vulnerable to government 
expropriation are more opaque in more predatory countries, especially when the price of 
oil is high, or if they are located in oil-rich countries. Each regression described in this 
section is run with industry, country, and year fixed effects. The reported p-values are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors. 
Table VI presents the estimates of regression (3) with the predation index as a 
measure of property rights protection. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
aggregate opacity index. Panels B-D use opacity components as dependent variables 
separately - accounting opacity in Panel B, insider opacity in Panel C, and informational 
opacity in Panel D.  We report two types of regressions per each panel. First, we regress 
opacity measures on the triple interaction term between industry oil price-dependency, 
country predation, and oil price. In these regressions, we control for the double 
interaction effects of oil price-dependency with predation, oil price-dependency with oil 
price, country predation with oil price, and external financing need with predation. The 
regressions also include country predation and the need for external financing. The 
second types of regressions use country oil reserves instead of oil price. 
According to Panel A, oil price-dependent industries in more predatory countries 
have lower aggregate transparency, especially during periods of high oil prices. This is 
evident from the positive and significant coefficient on the triple interaction term. This 
result holds if we substitute oil price with the country oil reserves. Some of the double 
interaction effects and the levels of individual variables are significant as well. 
Specifically, industries more dependent on oil located in more predatory countries are 
less transparent, independently of oil price or country oil reserves; the coefficient on the 
interaction of oil dependency with predation is positive and significant in both 
specifications of Panel A. Moreover, countries abundant in oil are less transparent if 
governments are more predatory; the coefficient on interaction of oil reserves with 
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predation is positive and significant. The coefficient on external financing is negative 
and significant.  
Next we repeat the above regressions using the individual components of the 
opacity index. First, we use the accounting opacity as a measure of earning quality 
(Panel B). It turns out that the main variable of interest, the triple interaction term, has 
the largest impact (in terms of its significance level) on the accounting opacity compared 
to the remaining two opacity measures, insider opacity and informational opacity. With 
very few exceptions, the coefficients on the double interaction terms and the level 
variables are comparable to those in the regression with the aggregate opacity index 
described above. There is one notable exception. When country oil reserves are used ( 
second specifications of Panels B, C, and D), the coefficient on the predation index is 
positive and significant for all three individual opacity constituents. This means that, on 
average, more predatory countries are more opaque. 
When the second opacity component is used, the insider opacity (Panel C), the 
coefficient on the interaction of oil-price dependency with oil price and predation is 
insignificant. However it becomes significant at the 10% level with country oil reserves. 
As for the third opacity component, information opacity (Panel D), the coefficient on the 
triple interaction term is significant at the 5% level when either oil price or oil reserves 
variables is used. 
Next we investigate the impact of industrial oil price-dependency and oil price 
(country oil reserves) on opacity conditional on how constrained the government is. The 
measure of the constraints is the autocracy index. The results are reported in Table VII. 
They are slightly weaker compared to those reported in Table VI. Specifically, the triple 
interaction term is insignificant when the dependent variable is aggregate opacity and 
when oil price is used. However, the interaction term between oil dependency, oil 
reserves, and autocracy is significant at 10% for all measures of opacity, except for one, 
insider opacity.15  
                                                 
15 The pattern of the results remains the same if we use the “proportional representation of votes” 
and “divided government” variables instead of the autocracy index.  
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As a robustness check, we proxy for the risk of expropriation by the oil and gas 
extraction industry dummy variable. In our sample, across all countries and years, this 
variable takes a value of one for 329 out of 25,854 observations. Although a smaller 
sample size weakens the power of our tests, most of the results reported above hold. 
Compared to the Table VI results (when predation index is used), it is significant for the 
aggregate opacity and for the individual components. Compared to the Table VII (when 
autocracy index is used) results, the interaction term is significant for aggregate opacity 
and accounting opacity but insignificant for insider opacity and informational opacity. 
To save space we do not report these results. 
Next, we turn our attention to the political variables. The variables we condition on 
are the party orientation (Table VII) and elections dummy variable given that the party 
orientation changes from right to left (Table VIII). 
According to Table VII, oil price-dependent industries, in general, are more opaque 
when the government is leftist as opposed to rightist. Particularly, the interaction term 
between oil price-dependency, left government dummy variable, and oil price or oil 
reserves is positive and significant for aggregate opacity, accounting opacity, and 
informational opacity; it is insignificant for insider opacity. According to the double 
interaction effects and the level variables, the countries with left government are more 
opaque. Opacity also increases if left governments are in countries with more oil. This is 
evident from the negative and significant coefficient on the left government dummy but 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between left party dummy variable 
and oil reserves. This result is consistent with the notion that the further left a particular 
country’s government is oriented, the more likely it is to pursue redistributive policies 
instead of free market-oriented policies.16 
 In Table VIII, we report the results with the elections dummy variable. The elections 
dummy takes a value of one for years when the elections of chief executives take place 
                                                 
16 By including country and industry fixed effects, we essentially compare opacity levels of 
industries that belong to the same country, and thus avoid a potential problem of a left wing 
government in, for instance Germany, being more business-friendly than a right government, say 
in Mexico. 
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and the party orientation changes from right to left. Presumably there is an increase in 
uncertainty about the future government policies pertaining to how friendly the 
governments would be to private enterprises. With the election year dummy, we obtain 
the following results. Election year dummy (conditional on party change from right to 
left) in the triple interaction term is negative and significant for all opacity measures, 
except for the insider opacity. The double interaction terms as well as the level variables 
are mostly insignificant.  
Taken together, Tables VII and VIII, and IX confirm the predictions of our stylized 
theoretical model. As the level of predation or government autocracy increases, 
industries more susceptible to expropriation become more opaque. This effect is 
especially strong in oil-rich countries or during the periods of high oil prices. The results 
are robust to multiple definitions of opacity: information opacity, accounting opacity 
and the aggregate index that captures the common component of the three individual 
constituents. The results are weaker for the insider opacity variables.  
 
V. Impact of Predation on Capital Allocation and Industry Growth of 
Oil-dependent Industries 
In this section, we examine the effect of lower corporate transparency on the quality of 
industrial capital allocation and growth.  
 
A. The Measures of Capital Allocation Efficiency and Industrial Growth 
Capital allocation is calculated as in Wurgler (2000) using industrial panel data from the 
United Nation’s General Industrial Statistics (INDSTAT-3 CD-ROM).17 The data contain 
major industrial statistics for 57 industries from 60 countries from 1963 through 1994. To 
be consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998) we consider the time period from 1980 
through 1990. Two variables are used to construct the capital allocation efficiency 
measure: gross fixed capital formation and value-added. Value-added is the value of 
                                                 
17 Using aggregate industrial statistics from the United Nations makes the estimation of (12) more 
precise. Unlike the Worldscope that contains information only on publicly-listed firms, the UN 
collects statistics about aggregate levels of industrial production. 
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shipments of goods produced minus the cost of intermediate goods and required 
services (excluding labor). Gross fixed capital formation is the cost of new and used 
fixed assets minus the value of sales of used fixed assets, where the fixed assets include 
land and buildings.  
According to Wurgler (2000), efficient capital allocation involves increase in 
investment in growing industries and decrease in investment in declining industries. 
Thus we define capital allocation efficiency as the country-specific, industry-specific 
elasticity ( cjΩ ) of investment (I) with respect to value-added (V). To estimate the 
elasticity we run, 
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for every industry j and country c using all available annual data from 1980 through 
1990. In (12), c tj ,ϕ is the error term. We drop industries if the number of observations to 
run regression (12) is less than ten. Both investment and value-added are deflated by the 
Producer Price Index. Industry growth is measured as the growth in real value-added 
calculated from 1980 through 1990.18  
In the capital allocation regression, some of the variables are different from those 
used in the opacity regressions. First, the predation index is modified because the one 
we used in the opacity sample is not available for prior to 1994. The predation index is 
now based on the “quality of governance” dataset from Knack (1999). It consists of 
annual values for (i) corruption in government (the degree to which corruption distorts 
economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability); (ii) rule of law (assessment of the law and order tradition); (iii) quality of 
bureaucracy (assessment whether bureaucracy impedes fair business practices); (iv) risk 
of repudiation of contracts by government (likelihood that a country will modify or 
                                                 
18 The UN data is classified by the International SIC codes (ISIC) classification. We manually 
match the ISIC codes with the SIC codes.  
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repudiate a contract with a foreign business); (v) risk of expropriation of private 
investment (evaluation of the risk of outright confiscation and forced nationalization of 
property). All individual components come from the International Country Risk Guide. We 
first take the average values of each component (over 1980-1990) and then extract the 
first principal component to construct a single measure. The loadings for the predation 
index are: 0.439 for the corruption index; 0.440 for the rule of law index; 0.450 for the 
quality of bureaucracy; 0.452 for the risk of contracts repudiation; and 0.455 for the risk 
of expropriation. 
We also use different controls. Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that more financially-
dependent industries outgrow less financially-dependent industries in countries that are 
more financially developed. Thus we control for the interaction of industry financial 
need with country financial development. Financial development is defined as the sum 
of stock market capitalization and private credit relative to GDP. This variable is taken 
directly from Rajan and Zingales (1998).19 We also control for the interaction of 
intangible assets intensity with country expropriation risk index (the latter variable is 
from the International Country Risk Guide). Claessens and Laeven (2003) show that in 
countries with more secure property rights, intangibles-intensive industries growth 
faster. As in case with the external financing needs variable, intangibles intensity is 
measured using U.S. data. It is defined as the ratio of intangible assets (COMPUSTAT 
item #33) to net property, plant, and equipment (#8).  
Tables X contains summary statistics grouped by country (country average values of 
allocation efficiency and industry growth, country financial development, country 
predation, and autocracy). Consistent with Wurgler (2000), more financially developed 
countries exhibit better allocation of capital. The correlation coefficient between country 
financial development and capital allocation is 0.30 (p-value = 0.06). 
 
B. Regression Results 
The capital allocation and industry growth regressions are similar to (3),  
 
                                                 
19 The data are available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu /luigi.zingales/research. 
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The above regressions are run on a sample of 1,304 industries (33 two-digit SIC 
industries) from 33 countries.20 We only estimate specifications with oil reserves; we 
cannot use oil price as our dependent variables are averaged over the respective time 
periods. We control for interaction effects between the need for external financing and 
country financial development; and between intangible assets intensity and country risk 
of government expropriation.  In the growth regressions, we also include the beginning 
period (year 1980) level of value-added to account for initial growth conditions.  
                                                 
20 Country oil reserves and predation do not enter (13) individually because we already control 
for country fixed effects. For the same reason, we exclude party orientation and elections 
variables from our analysis.  
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Table XI 
Industry capital allocation efficiency and industry growth of oil price-dependent industries conditional on 
predation and autocracy. 
Regressions of industry capital allocation efficiency and industry growth on interactions of oil price-dependency 
with country oil reserves and predation or autocracy with industry and country fixed effects, and robust standard 
errors. 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of capital allocation efficiency (Panel A) or industry growth (Panel B). The independent variables are: 
interaction term of industry oil price-dependency with country oil reserves and country predation or autocracy; industry oil price-dependency with 
country oil reserves; industry oil price-dependency with predation or autocracy; country oil reserves with predation or autocracy; industry external 
financing needs with country financial development; industry intangibles intensity with risk of expropriation; and industry share of value-added. All 
regressions include industry and country fixed effects. All regression coefficients are multiplied by 10. The coefficients significant at the 10% level 
(based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in bold face.  Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
dependent variable 
Panel A:  
capital allocation efficiency 
Panel B:  
industry growth 
country measures 
 predation  autocracy Predation autocracy 
oil price-dependency × oil reserves × predation or autocracy -0.001967 -0.001632 -0.002416 -0.006045 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
oil price-dependency × oil reserves 0.060127 0.034103 -0.019346 -0.001488 
  (0.13) (0.36) (0.20) (0.91) 
oil price-dependency × predation or autocracy -0.00207 -0.00227 0.04638 0.03905 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.25) (0.25) 
external financing need × financial development 0.04006 0.04611 0.06410 0.06665 
  (0.23) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) 
intangibles intensity × expropriation 0.00080 0.00075 -0.00217 -0.00225 
  (0.52) (0.55) (0.03) (0.02) 
industry share of value-added - - -0.86418 -0.84089 
    (0.00) (0.84) 
industry fixed effects included Included Included included 
country fixed effects included Included Included included 
R2 0.161 0.159 0.327 0.323 
number of observations 1,034 1,034 1,016 1,016 
number of industries 33 35 33 35 
number of countries 41 41 41 41 
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In Table XI, we test the hypothesis that more oil price-dependent industries exhibit 
worse capital allocation and slower growth in value-added in more predatory or 
autocratic countries, especially if those countries are abundant in natural resources. Each 
regression contains industry- and country- specific effects. The reported p-values are 
calculated using heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors.  
Panel A reports the results of the regression when the dependent variable is capital 
allocation efficiency. The main variable of interest is the triple interaction effect between 
industry oil price-dependency, country oil reserves, and country predation index or 
autocracy index. The coefficient on the interaction variable is negative and significant 
independently of whether predation or autocracy index is used. Thus the elasticity of 
investment with respect to value-added is lower for oil price-dependent industries in 
more predatory countries with larger oil reserves. This is consistent with our conjecture 
that capital allocation is worse for industries in countries with lower institutional 
development, especially when the industries are located in resources-abundant 
countries. In all regressions, we control for the double interaction effects, which include 
the interactions between industry oil dependency with predation and oil dependency 
with country oil reserves. The interaction between oil price-dependency and predation 
index is significant. The sign of this coefficient is negative indicating that oil price-
dependent industries exhibit worse capital allocation independent of countries’ oil 
reserves. The interaction effects of external financing with financial development as well 
as intangibles intensity with expropriation risk turn out insignificant. 
The results of the growth regressions appear in Panel B of Table XI. They are also 
consistent with the resource curse argument. The triple interaction effect is negative and 
significant showing a significantly slower growth of oil price-dependent industries in 
oil-rich countries with more predatory or autocratic governments. Consistent with Rajan 
and Zingales (1998), more financially-dependent industries grow faster in better-
financially developed countries. We also reconfirm the result of Claessens and Lauven 
(2003) that industries with a greater proportion of intangible assets grow faster in 
countries where property rights are secure. This is evident from the negative and 
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significant coefficient on the interaction term between intangibles intensity and the risk 
of expropriation. 
 
VI. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks 
A. Alternative Explanations 
The empirical facts we have presented are consistent with our predictions – companies 
increase opacity in response to government predatory actions. In this section, we 
consider alternative interpretations and try to reject them. 
First, according to our interpretations, companies strategically withhold information 
in response to the risk of expropriation. However, one could argue that causality runs in 
the opposite direction. Specifically, more opaque companies, especially government 
monopolies, may try to secure natural resources rents by lobbying for the type of 
government that would set up inefficient institutions.21 This view, nonetheless, would be 
inconsistent with the findings by Kolotilin (2007) who shows that oil companies are 
under a greater risk of nationalization by governments in countries with imperfect 
institutions. Moreover, our results indicate that the effect of predation on opacity is 
actually larger when countries are rich in oil and when oil prices are high. Moreover, 
controlling for country and industry fixed effects and other relevant variables, the 
correlation between opacity and predation per se is not significant. One more argument 
which supports our explanation and contests the reverse causality arguments is the 
evidence from the election years. We show that opacity increases during the election 
years, which, in most countries, follow an exogenous cycle with respect to firm opacity.  
Second, it could be the case that some of our results are driven by changes in firms’ 
fundamentals in response to economic shocks. For example, high oil prices may stabilize 
firms’ fundamentals. More stable fundamentals, in turn, affect the measure of 
informational opacity, since firms with more stable earnings are also likely to have 
similar returns. This reasoning, however, would affect only one out of three opacity 
                                                 
21
 Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that incumbent companies can use laws and regulations to 
their advantage by hindering financial development that would otherwise benefit young 
companies. 
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measures, namely the informational opacity. There is no reason to expect that the other 
two measures of opacity (insider opacity and accounting opacity) are affected by 
changes in firm fundamentals. Nevertheless, we check the robustness of the results by 
directly controlling for firms’ fundamentals stability. We measure it as the coefficient of 
determination (R2) of the following regression, 
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where ROAi is the return on assets for company i, ROAm is the value-weighted average 
of ROA across all firms in country c, and UStmROA ,  is the value-weighted average of ROA 
across U.S. firms. The above regression is calculated for each firm starting year 2000 
using a ten-year rolling-window data. We then aggregate this measure by taking 
industry averages. The main results reported above remain unchanged with this 
additional control. 
Third, although we hope that industry fixed effects are adequate to control for 
industry unobserved characteristics, we can never be sure that our results are not driven 
by missing industry factors. Private businesses, including oil price-dependent firms can 
reduce the risk of government expropriation by becoming more indispensable to the 
rulers. This can be achieved, for example, by seeking greater internationalization, 
securing higher levels of short-term debt, using more tangible assets, and/or hiring more 
employees. To check the robustness of our results, we explicitly control for the 
aforementioned factors.  
Companies with greater international exposure may be more immune to 
government expropriation. For example, when shareholder rights are violated, investors 
can file claims in international rather than local courts (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2003); Siegel (2005)). To control for internalization we include the cross-listing dummy 
variable and the value of exports relative to sales. Companies can also alter their capital 
structure to elude government capture. It is established that debt rather than equity, and 
in particular short-term debt, is a main source of financing in developing countries (see, 
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e.g., Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) and Fan, Titman, and Twite (2005)). Short-term debt 
can serve not only as a monitoring device but also as an instrument to make state 
capture costlier (Stulz (2005)). Consequently, we control for the level of short-term debt 
(past ratio of short-term debt to sales). Fixed assets are harder to expropriate (Claessens 
and Laeven (2003); Klapper and Love (2004)). Thus we also control for fixed assets 
proxied by the past ratio of property, plant, and equipment to sales. Finally, firms that 
employ more workers would presumably suffer less from government interference 
because unemployment-conscious governments are less likely to bring a firm to 
bankruptcy. We control for employment by the ratio of the number of employees to 
sales. Our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.  
Fourth, firms’ ownership structure may matter. For instance, firms in more 
predatory countries may seek to appoint politicians as the members of their boards to 
avoid government capture.22 Moreover, firms with state ownership are under a lower 
risk of government expropriation. We do not control for ownership in our regressions 
because international time-series ownership data are very scant. However, we reckon 
that controlling for ownership should make our results even stronger. We are less likely 
to observe our results without including ownership variables because state-owned firms 
or firms with political connections are likely to be less opaque under more predatory 
regimes. Nevertheless, we perform one robustness test by dropping firms with a large 
ownership block by governments (ownership greater than 10%) and find that none of 
the reported results are affected. 
                                                 
22
 Faccio (2005) examines the value of political loyalty and finds a positive valuation effect when 
corporate directors belong to ruling parties. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) document 
that politically-connected firms are more likely to be bailed out during financial distress. Leuz 
and Oberholzer (2006) study the role of political ties for firms' financing strategies and their long-
run financial performance. They find that firms with political connections are less likely to rely on 
publicly traded securities. Bertrand et al. (2006) investigate the origins of political ties and argue 
that privatized firms with greater government residual ownership are more likely to become 
politically loyal. 
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VII. Related Literature  
Our paper is related to three streams of literature. First, there is the resource curse 
literature which focuses on the effects of resource abundance and institutions on 
economic growth. Second, there is literature on the political economy of corporate 
governance that shows that imperfect political institutions may result in inefficient 
disclosure and suboptimal corporate governance. Third, there are studies that examine 
the implications of corporate governance and disclosure for efficiency and growth at the 
firm level.  
Sachs and Warner (1997) were first to show that the share of primary resources in 
exports negatively affects economic growth in standard growth regressions. Early 
studies have attributed this phenomenon to the macroeconomic “Dutch disease”: 
Krugman (1987) considers a model with dynamic economies of scale where the negative 
effect of resource abundance on the competitiveness of manufacturing sector may have 
long-term implications.  
However, the recent literature (Lane and Tornell, 1996, Ades and Di Tella, 1999, 
Auty, 2001, Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier, 2006, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006, 
Caselli, 2006, Hodler, 2006, and Boschini et al., 2006) shows that the negative effect of 
resource abundance on growth is related to the deterioration of economic and political 
institutions. In particular, Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) find that in countries with 
mature institutions, natural resources have no significant impact on economic growth; if 
anything, the effect is positive. However, if institutions are underdeveloped, resource 
abundance negatively and significantly affects growth. Resource rents create incentives 
for the political elite to engage in rent-seeking rather than productive activities, and 
suppress the development of property rights, and of governmental checks and balances. 
The latter effect is also documented by Tsui (2005) who shows that an unexpected 
discovery of oil reduces the level of democracy in a country in the subsequent 30 years. 
Using a panel of countries Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2007) show that controlling for 
country fixed effects, oil richness implies lower media freedom. Kolotilin (2007) finds 
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that nationalization of private oil companies is more likely in countries with imperfect 
political institutions, and when oil prices are high. Using the case of Russian oil export, 
Berkowitz and Semikolenova (2006) argue that an increase in tax revenue due to high oil 
prices enables governments to delay institutional reforms. Boschini et al. (2006) show 
that the negative effect of resource abundance on growth depends on the extent of the 
resources’ “appropriability.” As rents from mining oil, diamonds, and precious metals 
are easier to capture than the rents in agricultural production, the countries richer in the 
former resources are more vulnerable to the resource curse.   
The literature also identifies the human capital channel of the resource curse. 
Gylfason (2001) argues that natural resource abundance reduces incentives for 
accumulating human capital thus suppressing long-term growth rates. Suslova and 
Volchkova (2007) use the Rajan-Zingales methodology (similar to the methodology used 
in this paper) to provide microeconomic evidence supporting this conjecture.  
Most of the empirical resource curse literature faces serious methodological 
problems. As institutions change very slowly, the empirical analysis is generally 
conducted using cross-country Ordinary Least Squares regressions that are vulnerable 
to multiple biases. The few exceptions using the panel data and Instrumental Variables 
estimation include the abovementioned Tsui (2005), Egorov et al. (2007), and Suslova 
and Volchkova (2007). We contribute to this research stream using the Rajan-Zingales 
within-country method and supplement it by taking advantage of the time variation in 
the expropriation risk. 
The literature on the effects of political institutions on corporate governance is 
related to the classical political theories described in North (1990) and Olson (1993). 
These theories contend that individuals and governments who hold authority shape 
policies to increase their chances to stay in power and accumulate wealth. According to 
Rajan and Zingales (2003), centralized and closed governments can achieve these goals 
by constraining financial development. Politicians can also suppress competition to 
maintain their economic advantage. For example, states might control information 
(especially firm-specific information) to hide expropriation by politicians. Moreover, the 
deals between some firms and governments require opaqueness. Chaney, Faccio, and 
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Parsley (2007) find that the quality of earnings reported by politically-connected firms is 
significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Additionally, among 
connected firms, those that have stronger political ties have the poorest accruals quality. 
This evidence suggests that managers of connected firms appear to be less sensitive to 
market pressures to increase the quality of information. 
The other effect of political economy on corporate governance is described by Volpin 
and Pagano (2005). They provide a model in which left governments implement laws 
that protect labor and right governments are more likely to favor governance and 
investor protection. Several papers incorporate a regulator into a traditional manager-
shareholder model and examine how managerial incentives change when companies 
avoid taxes through various tax sheltering schemes. Specifically, Desai, Dyck, and 
Zingales (2007) show that stricter tax enforcement improves firm governance because 
enforcement involves the verification of financial statements’ numbers. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2004, 2006) investigate how firm governance interacts with firm incentives 
to use tax shelters and the impact of tax sheltering on firm valuation. In their models, 
sheltering raises shareholder wealth for firms with strong governance. Stulz (2006) 
models the complementary relation between managerial diversion and state 
expropriation and discusses how state quality affects investment strategies and 
corporate ownership.  
The third stream of literature investigates the relationship between investor 
protection, firm governance, financial markets development, and economic growth. It is 
shown that better legal protection for investors is associated with higher valuation of the 
stock market (La Porta et al., 2002). Recent firm-level studies also shows that good 
corporate governance implemented by individual firms yields higher returns for 
shareholders, making the effort of improving governance worth the cost (Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003, Klapper and Love, 2004, 
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006, Black, Love, and Rachinsky, 2006, 
Aggarwal et al., 2007; Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007)). 
Our paper connects all the three streams of literature as we build a consistent 
microeconomic argument linking resource abundance, poor property rights protection, 
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incentives to withhold information, and slower growth. We show that this argument is 
empirically supported by results using the data on 72 industries from 51 countries and 
16 years.   
 
VII. Concluding Remarks  
In this paper, we propose and test a new channel through which the abundance of 
natural resources can reduce economic growth. Specifically, corporations in industries 
whose profitability is highly correlated with the price of natural resources are at risk of 
profits expropriation. Companies can lessen this risk by reducing corporate 
transparency by hiding profits or managing earnings. Lower corporate transparency, in 
turn, leads to inefficient capital allocation, which hampers economic growth. 
For the empirical tests, we construct an index of corporate opacity which consists of 
three attributes: accounting opacity, insider opacity, and informational opacity. We use 
industry oil price-dependency (the sensitivity of industry profits to oil prices) to proxy 
for the risk of government intervention. Our sample consists of 25,854 industry-year 
observations from 51 countries.  Controlling for country, industry, and year fixed effects, 
we find that more oil price-dependent industries are less transparent in countries with 
more autocratic regimes or countries where institutions are less developed. This effect is 
stronger in countries where and when the oil rents are higher – in countries with larger 
reserves of oil and when oil prices are high.  
We also explore the role of political cycles and elections in determining corporate 
transparency. It turns out that oil price-dependent industries are more opaque when the 
head of state’s political party’s orientation is left rather than right and during national 
elections, that is, when uncertainty about future government policies is higher. This 
result is consistent with the notion that leftist governments favor redistributive policies. 
Next, we investigate whether corporate opacity of oil price-dependent industries has 
a significant impact on investment efficiency and growth. Economic growth requires 
efficient allocation of capital. The quality of capital allocation, in turn, depends on the 
capital markets’ ability to process information efficiently. We find strong evidence that 
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corporate opacity induced by government predatory policies and oil price-dependency 
has adverse effects on industrial capital allocation and growth. Specifically, the 
sensitivity of investment with respect to value-added as well as the rate of growth in 
value-added are significantly lower in more oil price-dependent industries in countries 
with weaker property rights. The results are robust to adding a variety of controls and 
alternative specifications. 
Our results therefore support the emerging consensus that slower growth in 
resource-rich economies may be explained by the negative impact of resource 
endowments on the development of economic and political institutions, which in turn 
suppresses economic growth. Our main contribution is empirical. Unlike existing 
sources, which are mostly based on cross-country comparisons, we use an industry-
country-year panel. We examine the effect of government predation on corporate 
transparency, capital allocation, and growth in resource industries at the microeconomic 
level controlling for industry- and country-specific effects.  
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Table I 
Election Cycles, 1990-2004 
 
This table lists the types of political systems (presidential or parliamentary), the government chief executive’s party orientation during the sample period (left, right, or center), years and dates of the 
elections of government chief executives. Data source: World Bank's Database of Political Institutions supplemented with information from the Journal of Democracy, Elections around the World 
(http://www.electionworld.org/), Election Guide (http://www.electionguide.org/), and the CIA Factbook. “NA” appears for cases in which the exact party orientation cannot be determined.  
 
country system 
party 
orientation 
elections 
years 
elections 
dates country system 
party 
orientation 
elections 
years 
elections 
dates country System 
party 
orientation 
elections 
years 
elections 
dates 
Argentina Presidential 1990-1995: R - - Indonesia Parliamentary 1990-1992: NA - - Portugal Parliamentary 1990-1991: R - - 
    1996-1999: R 1995 14-May-95     1993-1996: NA 1992 9-Jun-92     1992-1995: R 1991 6-Oct-91 
    2000-2001: C 1999 24-Oct-99     1998-1999: NA 1997 30-May-97     1996-1999: L 1995 1-Oct-95 
    2002-2003: R - -     200-2004: NA 1999 NA     2000-2002: L 1999 10-Oct-99 
    2004: R 2003 27-Apr-03     - 2004 20-Sep-04     2003-2004: R 2002 17-Mar-02 
Australia Parliamentary 1990-1992: L 1990 24-Mar-90 Ireland Parliamentary 1990-1992: C - - Russia Parliamentary 1990-1991: L - - 
    1993-1996: L 1993 13-Mar-93     1993-1994: C 1992 25-Nov-92     
1992-1996: 
NA 1991 12-Jun-91 
    1997-1998: R 1996 2-Mar-96     1995-1997: R - -     
1997-2000: 
NA 1996 16-Jun-96 
    1999-2001: R 1998 3-Oct-98     1998-2002: C 1997 6-Jun-97     
2001-2004: 
NA 2000 26-Mar-00 
    2002-2004: R 2001 10-Nov-01     2003-2004: C 2002 18-May-02     - 2004 14-Mar-04 
    2005-2006: L 2004 9-Oct-04 Israel Parliamentary 1990-1992: R - - Singapore Parliamentary 
1990-1991: 
NA - - 
Austria Parliamentary 1990-1994: L 1990 7-Oct-90     1993-1996: L 1992 19-Jun-92     
1992-1997: 
NA 1991 31-Aug-91 
    1995-1995: L 1994 9-Oct-94     1997-1999: R 1996 31-May-96     
1998-2001: 
NA 1997 2-Jun-97 
    1996-1999: L 1995 17-Dec-95     2000-2001: R 1999 31-May-99     
2002-2004: 
NA 2001 23-Sep-01 
    2000-2002: R 1999 3-Oct-99     2002-2004: R 2001 6-Feb-01 South Africa Parliamentary 1990-1994: R - - 
    2003-2004: R 2002 24-Nov-02 Italy Parliamentary 1990-1992: C - 23-Jun-92     1995-1999: L 1994 26-Apr-94 
Belgium Parliamentary 1990-1995: R 1991 24-Nov-91     1993-1994: L 1992 5-Apr-92     2000-2004: L 1999 2-Jun-99 
    1996-1999: R 1995 21-May-95     1995-1996: R 1994 26-Mar-94     - 2004 14-Apr-04 
    2000-2003: R 1999 13-May-99     1997-2001: C 1996 21-Apr-96 South Korea Presidential 1990-1992: R - - 
    2004: R 2003 18-May-03     2002-2004: R 2001 15-May-01     1993-1995: R 1992 24-Mar-92 
Brazil Presidential 1990-1994: R 1989 - Japan Parliamentary 1990: R 1986 7-Jul-86     1996-2000: C 1996 11-Apr-96 
    1995-1998: L 1994 3-Oct-94     1991-1993: R 1990 18-Feb-90     2001-2004: C 2000 13-Apr-00 
    1999-2002: L 1998 4-Oct-98     1994: R 1993 18-Jul-93     - 2004 15-Apr-04 
    2003-2004: L 2002 6-Oct-02     1995-1996: L - - Spain Parliamentary 1990-1993: L - - 
Canada Parliamentary 1990-1993: R 1988 21-Nov-88     1997-2000: R 1996 20-Oct-96     1994-1996: L 1993 6-Jun-93 
    1994-1997: L 1993 25-Oct-93     2001-2003: R 2000 25-Jun-00     1997-2000: R 1996 3-Mar-96 
    1998-2000: L 1997 13-Apr-90     2004: R 2003 9-Nov-03     2001-2004: R 2000 12-Mar-00 
    2001-2004: L 2000 27-Nov-00 Luxembourg Parliamentary 1990-1994: C - -     - 2004 14-Mar-04 
    2005: L 2004 28-Jun-04     1995-1999: C 1994 12-Jun-94 Sri Lanka Presidential 1990-1994: C - - 
Chile Presidential 1990-1993: R 1989 -     2000-2004: C 1999 13-Jun-99     1995-1999: L 1994 9-Nov-94 
    1994-1999: R 1993 11-Dec-93       2004 13-Jun-04     2000-2004: L 1999 21-Dec-99 
    2000-2004: R 2000 16-Jan-00 Malaysia Parliamentary 1990: NA - - Sweden Parliamentary 1990-1991: L - - 
China NA 1990-2004: L - -     1991-1995: NA 1990 21-Oct-90     1992-1994: R 1991 15-Sep-91 
Colombia Presidential 1990-1994: C 1990 27-May-90     1996-1999: NA 1995 24-May-95     1995-1998: L 1994 18-Sep-94 
    1995-1998: C 1994 29-May-94     2000-2003: NA 1999 29-Nov-99     1999-2002: L 1998 20-Sep-98 
    1999-2002: R 1998 31-May-98       2004 21-Mar-04     2003-2004: L 2002 17-Sep-02 
    
2003-2004: 
NA 2002 26-May-02 Mexico Presidential 1990-1994: L - - Switzerland Parliamentary 
1991-1991: 
NA - - 
Czech Rep. Parliamentary 1990: L - 24-Apr-90     1995-2000: L 1994 21-Aug-94     
1992-1995: 
NA 1991 20-Oct-91 
    
1991-1992: 
NA - -     2001-2004: R 2000 2-Jul-00     
1996-1999: 
NA 1995 22-Oct-95 
    1993-1996: R 1992 6-Jun-92 Morocco Presidential 1990-1993: NA - -     
2000-2003: 
NA 1999 24-Oct-99 
    1997-1998: R 1996 31-May-96     1994-1997: NA 1993 25-Jun-93     2004: R 2003 19-Oct-03 
    1999-2001: L 1998 13-Nov-98     1998-2002: NA 1997 14-Nov-97 Taiwan Parliamentary 1990-1992: R - - 
    2002-2004: L 2002 14-Jun-02     2003-2004: NA 2002 27-Sep-02     1993-1996: R 1992 9-Dec-92 
Denmark Parliamentary 1990-1993: R 1990 12-Dec-90 Netherlands Parliamentary 1990-1991: R - -     1997-2000: R 1996 23-Mar-96 
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    1994-1997: L 1994 21-Sep-94     1992-1994: R 1991 NA     2001-2004: R 2000 18-Mar-00 
    1998-2001: L 1998 11-Mar-98     1995-1998: L 1994 3-May-94     - 2004 20-Mar-04 
    2001-2004: R 2001 20-Nov-01     1999-2002: L 1998 6-May-98 Thailand Parliamentary 1990-1991: R - - 
Egypt Parliamentary 
1990-1995: 
NA 1990 29-Nov-90     2003: L 2002 15-May-02     1992: NA - - 
    
1995-2000: 
NA 1995 29-Nov-95     2004: R 2003 22-Jan-03     1993-1995: R 1992 13-Sep-92 
    
2001-2007: 
NA 2000 18-Oct-00 New Zealand Parliamentary 1990: L - -     1996: R 1995 2-Jul-95 
Finland Parliamentary 1990: R - -     1990-1993: R 1990 27-Oct-90     1997-2000: R 1996 17-Nov-96 
    1991-1995: C 1991 17-Mar-91     1994-1996: R 1993 6-Nov-93     
2001-2004: 
NA 2001 6-Jan-01 
    1996-1999: L 1995 19-Mar-95     1997-1999: R 1996 12-Oct-96 Turkey Parliamentary 1990-1991: R - - 
    2000-2002: L 1999 21-Mar-99     2000-2002: L 1999 27-Nov-99     1992-1995: R 1991 20-Oct-91 
    2003-2004: C 2003 16-Mar-03     2003-2004: L 2002 27-Jul-02     1996-1999: R 1995 24-Dec-95 
France Parliamentary 1990-1993: L 1988 9-May-88 Norway Parliamentary 1990: R - -     2000-2002: L 1999 18-Apr-99 
    1994-1997: R 1993 21-Mar-93     1991-1993: L - -     
2003-2004: 
NA 2002 3-Nov-02 
    1998-2002: L 1997 25-May-97     1994-1997: L 1993 13-Sep-93 U.K. Parliamentary 1990-1992: R 1987 12-Jun-87 
    2003-2004: R 2002 16-Jun-02     1998-2001: R 1997 16-Sep-97     1993-1997: R 1992 9-Apr-92 
Germany Parliamentary 1990-1993: R 1990 3-Dec-90     2002-2004: R 2001 10-Sep-01     1998-2001: L 1997 1-May-97 
    1994-1998: R 1994 16-Oct-94 Pakistan Parliamentary 1990: L - -     2002-2004: L 2001 7-Jun-01 
    1999-2002: L 1998 27-Sep-98     1991-1993: R 1990 24-Oct-90 U.S. Presidential 1990-1992: R 1988 9-Nov-88 
    2003-2004: L 2002 22-Sep-02     1994-1997: L 1993 6-Oct-93     1993-1996: L 1992 3-Nov-92 
Greece Parliamentary 1990: L - -     1998-2002: NA 1997 3-Feb-97     1997-2000: L 1996 5-Nov-96 
    1991-1993: R 1990 8-Apr-90     2003-2004: NA 2002 10-Oct-02     2001-2004: R 2000 7-Sep-00 
    1994-1996: L 1993 10-Oct-93 Peru Presidential 1990: L - -     - 2004 2-Sep-04 
    1997-2000: L 1996 22-Sep-96     1991-1995: R 1990 10-Jun-90 Venezuela Presidential 1990-1993: R - - 
    2001-2004: L 2000 9-Apr-00     1996-2000: R 1995 9-Apr-95     
1994-1998: 
NA 1993 5-Dec-93 
    - 2004 7-Mar-04     2001: R 2000 9-Apr-00     
1999-2000: 
NA 1998 6-Dec-98 
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA     2002-2004: C 2001 8-Apr-01     
2001-2004: 
NA 2000 30-Jul-00 
          Philippines NA 1990-1992: NA - - Zimbabwe Parliamentary 
1990-1996: 
NA 1990 27-Mar-90 
Hungary Parliamentary 1990: L - -     1993-1998: C 1992 11-May-92     
1997-2000: 
NA 1996 15-Mar-96 
    1991-1994: R 1990 25-Mar-90     1999-2000: NA 1998 11-May-98     
2001-2002: 
NA 2000 - 
    1995-1998: L 1994 8-May-94     2001-2004: C - -     
2003-2004: 
NA 2002 9-Mar-02 
    1999-2002: L 1998 10-May-98     - 2004 10-May-04           
    2003-2004: L 2002 4-Apr-02 Poland Presidential 1990: L - -           
India Parliamentary 1990-1991: L - -     1991-1995: NA 1990 9-Dec-90           
    1992-1996: L 1991 1-May-91     1996-2000: L 1995 5-Nov-95           
    1997-1998: L 1996 21-Apr-96     2001-2005: L 2000 8-Oct-00           
    1999: R 1998 16-Feb-98                     
    2000-2003: R 1999 5-Sep-99                     
    - 2004 20-Apr-04                     
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Table II  
Variables, definitions, and data sources  
 
Variables Definitions 
 
Corporate opacity sample 
 
Oil price This variable is the logarithm of inflation-adjusted (using Purchasing Price Index) oil price expressed in U.S. dollars per barrel. Data source: International Finance 
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund.  
Country oil reserves Country oil reserves are expressed in tens of millions of barrels. Data source: 2007 BP Statistical Review. 
Industry oil  price 
dependency 
Industry oil dependency is defined as a coefficient 2SICβ on the natural logarithm of oil price in a regression of industry inflation-adjusted valuation on time trend 
and log of real oil price, ( ) 22222 ln SICtoiltSICSICSICSICt PtQ µβα +++=  , where Q is the median industry valuation (inflation-adjusted using Producer Price Index), α is a 
constant, t is the time trend, Poil is inflation-adjusted price of oil, and µ is the error term. The above regression is estimated for every 2-digit SIC industry using a 
sample of U.S. publicly listed firms from the COMPUSTAT tapes from 1950 through 2005. Industry valuation is defined as the sum of firm market value 
(COMPUSTAT item #199 times #25), total assets (#6) minus firm book value of equity (#60) over firm total assets. Data source: COMPUSTAT North America 
industrial tapes. 
 
Accounting opacity The accounting opacity for firm i in country j is defined as the standard deviation of the error term of the following regression calculated over 1990-2005, 
c
tiJj j
c
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c
ti
cc
ti
c
ti
cc
ti
c
ti DDAEPPASalesATCA ,],[,,,,,, /&// ηβα τ τ ++++∆= ∑∑ ∈∈ 20051990 , where ∆ is the difference operator, c indexes countries, i indexes firms, and t 
indexes years.  Total current accruals, TCA, are defined as ∆(Current Assets) – ∆(Current Liabilities) – ∆ (Cash) + ∆ (Short-term and Current Long-term Debt); A is total 
assets, Sales is total sales, PP&E is the sum of net property, plant, and equipment, and accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization. Dj are two-
digit SIC industry fixed effects and Dτ are year fixed effects. All variables are expressed in U.S. dollars. We drop firms that have fewer than 5 observations to 
calculate this variable. Data source: Worldscope. 
 
Insider opacity Insider opacity is measures as coefficient C2 in the time-series regression, c
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ε+++=+  , run using weekly data for each firm i in country c 
during year t using at least 30 weeks of trading data from 1990 through 2005. Return Ri,t is defined as ( )( )cticticticti PDPR ,,,, /log += , where Pi,t is the weekly closing 
price, and Di,t is dividends per share. Trading volume, Vi,t, is calculated as de-trended volume, ( ) ( )∑
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, where VOL is the 
number of shares traded, and N is the number of shares outstanding. All variables are measured in U.S. dollars. Data source: Datastream for closing price, number of 
shares outstanding, number of shares traded, and Worldscope for dividends. 
 
Informational opacity Informational opacity is defined as ( ))/(ln ,, cici RR 22 1 − , where R2 is the coefficient of determination of the following  regression: ctiUStmc ic tmcicicti rrr ,,,2,,1, εββα +++= , where 
c
tir ,
 is firm i’s weekly return, 
c
tmr ,  is weekly value-weighted local market return, and 
US
tmr ,  is U.S. value-weighted market return. All returns are expressed in U.S. 
dollars. Local market and U.S. indexes exclude the firm in question to avoid spurious correlation between individual returns and indexes for markets with few firms. 
Data source: Datastream. 
 
Aggregate opacity Aggregate opacity is defined as the first principal component of accounting opacity, insider opacity, and informational opacity. The loadings for the principal 
component are: 0.550 for the accounting opacity, 0.526 for the insider opacity, and 0.649 for the informational opacity. Data source: Author’s own calculation. 
 
External financing need Industry external financing need is defined as industry median value of capital expenditures (#128) minus cash flows from operations (#123 + #125 + #126 + #106 + 
#213 +#217) divided by capital expenditures. The median value is taken using all firms and all years during time period from 1990 through 2005. This variable is 
calculated at the 2-digit SIC industry level using the sample of all U.S. firms included in the COMPUSTAT database. It is then matched (by 2-digit SIC code) with 
non-U.S. industries from our sample. Data source: COMPUSTAT North America industrial tapes. 
 
Predation Predation is defined as the first principal component of (i) corruption in government (the degree to which corruption distorts economic and financial environment, 
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability); (ii) risk of government 
expropriation (risk of expropriation by governments based on a business environment ranking that quantifies the attractiveness of the business environment); (iii) 
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property rights protection; (iv) rule of law (assessment of the law and order tradition); (v) government stance towards business (assessment of the likelihood that the 
current government will implement liberal and business-friendly policies); (vi) freedom to compete (assessment of government policies towards establishing a free 
competitive environment); (vii) quality of bureaucracy (assessment whether bureaucracy impedes fair business practices); and (viii) impact of crime (measurement 
whether violent crime is a problem for government and business). The loadings for the principal component are: 0.344 for the corruption index; 0.353 for the risk of 
government expropriation; 0.372 for property rights protection index; 0.366 for the rule of law index; 0.353 for the government stance towards business index; 0.349 
for the freedom to compete index; 0.370 for the quality of bureaucracy index;  and 0.319 for the impact of crime index. Larger numbers indicate a greater degree of 
government predation. We multiply this index by -1 and add a constant equal to the maximum value of the index so that larger values of the index represent a 
greater degree of predation. Data source: author’s own calculation, International Country Risk Guide and Economist Intelligence Unit. 
 
Autocracy The autocracy index is calculated as the “autocratic government” variable minus the “democratic government” variable. The “autocratic government” variable 
measures general closedness of political institutions. The “democratic government” index measures general openness of political institutions. The two variables 
access (i) competitiveness of political participation; (ii) regulation of participation; (iii) the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment; and (iv) 
constraints on the chief executive. We add the constant of value 10 to the score to change the original -10-to-+10 range to the 0-to-20 range. Data source: POLITY IV. 
Party orientation of the 
government chief executive 
This variable is the party orientation (left, right, or center) of the chief executive.  Data source: the World Bank’s database on political institutions compiled by Beck et 
al. (2001). The data are cross-checked using the following sources: Journal of Democracy, Elections around the World (http://www.electionworld.org/), Election Guide 
(http://www.electionguide.org/), and CIA Factbook.  
 
Election dummy variable 
conditional on party 
change from right to left 
This variable takes a value of one if the party orientation has changed from right to left during the election year. The election year is defined as the year of election of 
chief executive, which is the year of parliamentary election for a parliamentary system or assembly elected presidential system and the year of election of a president 
for a presidential system. Data source: the World Bank’s database on political institutions compiled by Beck et al. (2001). The data are cross-checked using the 
following sources: Journal of Democracy, Elections around the World (http://www.electionworld.org/), Election Guide (http://www.electionguide.org/), and CIA Factbook.  
 
Capital allocation sample  
Capital allocation efficiency Capital allocation efficiency is defined as the elasticity (Ω) of investment (I) with respect to value-added (V). To estimate the elasticity we run, the following 
regression, ( ) ( ) cicticticicicticti VVII ϕα +Ω+= −− 11 ,,,, /ln/ln . It is run for every country-industry pair using all available data from 1964 through 1994. Investment (I) is 
measured as gross fixed capital formation. Both investment and value-added (V) are deflated by the Producer Price Index. Data source: the United Nation’s General 
Industrial Statistics (INDSTAT-3 CD-ROM).  
 
Industry growth of in 
value-added 
It is measured as the growth rate in real value-added over 1980-1990 time period. Data source: Rajan and Zingales (1998) and the United Nation’s General Industrial 
Statistics (INDSTAT-3 CD-ROM). 
 
Industry share of value-
added 
This variable is defined as industry’s share of value-added in a country’s total value-added. Data source: Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
Intangibles intensity Intangibles intensity is measured as the ratio of intangible assets (#33) to net property, plant, and equipment (#8). Data source: COMPUSTAT North America 
industrial tapes. 
Predation for the capital 
allocation sample 
Predation is defined as the first principal component of (i) corruption in government (the degree to which corruption distorts economic and financial environment, 
reducing the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability); (ii) rule of law 
(assessment of the law and order tradition); (iii) quality of bureaucracy (assessment whether bureaucracy impedes fair business practices); (iv) risk of repudiation of 
contracts by government (likelihood that a country will modify or repudiate a contract with a foreign business); (v) risk of expropriation of private investment 
(evaluation of the risk of outright confiscation and forced nationalization of property). The loadings for the principal component are: 0.439 for the corruption index; 
0.440 for the rule of law index; 0.450 for the quality of bureaucracy; 0.452 for the risk of contracts repudiation; and 0.455 for the risk of expropriation. We multiply 
this index by -1 and add a constant equal to the maximum value of the index so that larger values of the index represent a greater degree of predation. Data source: 
the “Quality of Governance” sample from Knack (1999). Raw data is from the International Country Risk Guide. 
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Table III 
Opacity sample: Descriptive statistics by industry, 1990-2005. 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the opacity sample by industry (averages across industries and years, 1990-2005). SIC code is 2-digit 
Standard Industry Classification code. The variables are: oil price-dependency, accounting opacity, insider opacity, informational opacity, and 
aggregate opacity. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. “Number of countries” is the aggregate number of industry observations 
across all countries and years, 1990-2005. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
Sic code industry name 
oil price-
dependency 
accounting 
opacity 
insider 
opacity 
informational 
opacity 
aggregate 
opacity 
number 
of 
countries 
100 Agricultural Production Crops -0.110 0.143 -0.016 -1.961 0.109 210 
200 Agriculture -0.428 0.285 -0.019 -1.702 0.166 240 
700 Agricultural Services -0.265 0.303 -0.005 -2.030 0.244 163 
800 Forestry -1.087 0.381 -0.002 -1.830 0.169 230 
900 Fishing, hunting, and trapping -0.103 0.144 -0.012 -1.818 0.019 65 
1000 Metal Mining -0.151 0.446 -0.011 -1.642 0.278 367 
1200 Coal Mining 0.057 0.366 -0.012 -1.683 0.272 150 
1300 Oil And Gas Extraction 0.049 0.271 -0.002 -1.481 0.018 329 
1400 Mining Of Nonmetallic Minerals 0.078 0.141 0.018 -1.875 0.165 235 
1500 Building Construction -0.024 0.200 -0.007 -1.584 -0.062 510 
1600 Heavy Construction -0.245 0.214 -0.011 -1.498 -0.116 427 
1700 Construction Special -0.237 0.204 -0.005 -1.839 0.144 308 
2000 Food And Kindred Products 0.007 0.157 -0.011 -1.600 -0.091 702 
2100 Tobacco Products 0.210 0.244 -0.010 -1.633 0.120 245 
2200 Textile Mill Products -0.207 0.181 -0.007 -1.738 0.020 491 
2300 Apparel And Other Finished Products -0.174 0.183 -0.011 -1.717 0.019 437 
2400 Lumber And Wood -0.414 0.262 -0.006 -1.782 0.056 372 
2500 Furniture And Fixtures -0.308 0.125 -0.003 -1.857 0.030 303 
2600 Paper And Allied Products -0.133 0.148 -0.008 -1.608 -0.118 579 
2700 Printing, Publishing, And Allied Industries -0.352 0.135 0.004 -1.750 0.000 458 
2800 Chemicals And Allied Products -0.354 0.298 -0.005 -1.454 0.039 636 
2900 Petroleum Refining -0.516 0.202 -0.014 -1.114 -0.361 381 
3000 Rubber And Miscellaneous Plastics Products -0.100 0.159 -0.015 -1.546 -0.159 494 
3100 Leather And Leather Products -0.099 0.132 -0.021 -1.514 -0.232 199 
3200 Stone, Clay, Glass, And Concrete -0.058 0.120 -0.010 -1.341 -0.326 618 
3300 Primary Metal Industries -0.071 0.175 -0.008 -1.397 -0.209 630 
3400 Fabricated Metal Products -0.033 0.202 -0.002 -1.737 0.057 470 
3500  Machinery -0.101 0.177 -0.014 -1.617 -0.070 548 
3600 Electronic Equipment -0.121 0.221 -0.016 -1.492 -0.108 549 
3700 Transportation Equipment -0.071 0.195 -0.005 -1.575 -0.030 536 
3800 Measuring Instruments -0.301 0.167 -0.005 -1.601 -0.055 350 
3900 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries -0.332 0.250 0.004 -1.698 0.183 353 
4000 Railroad Transportation 0.060 0.126 -0.025 -1.807 0.075 118 
4100 Local And Suburban Transit 0.117 0.267 -0.004 -1.925 0.233 218 
4200 Motor Freight Transportation -0.021 0.195 -0.007 -1.654 -0.034 302 
4400 Water Transportation -0.034 0.108 -0.004 -1.585 -0.174 488 
4500 Transportation By Air -0.285 0.182 -0.027 -1.360 -0.288 421 
4600 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas -0.137 1.207 -0.007 -1.934 1.610 29 
4700 Transportation Services -0.508 0.173 -0.007 -1.653 -0.027 414 
4800 Communications 0.090 0.273 -0.012 -1.191 -0.224 597 
4900 Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services -0.009 0.163 -0.010 -1.433 -0.199 583 
5000 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods -0.157 0.270 0.001 -1.633 0.096 568 
5100 Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods -0.057 0.237 -0.013 -1.549 -0.013 618 
5200 Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply 0.036 0.153 -0.011 -1.758 -0.076 134 
5300 General Merchandise Stores -0.469 0.325 -0.024 -1.406 -0.117 368 
5400 Food Stores -0.409 0.233 -0.012 -1.471 -0.098 451 
5500 Automotive Dealers And Gasoline Stations -0.054 0.265 0.004 -1.912 0.280 257 
5600 Apparel And Accessory Stores -0.074 0.213 0.023 -1.871 0.217 324 
5700 Home Furniture, Furnishings, And Equipment 0.034 0.284 -0.016 -1.768 0.160 302 
5800 Eating And Drinking Places -0.383 0.175 -0.001 -1.613 -0.050 302 
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5900 Miscellaneous Retail -0.411 0.315 0.000 -1.704 0.226 386 
6000 Depository Institutions -0.157 0.232 -0.019 -1.133 -0.474 725 
6100 Non-depository Credit Institutions -0.143 0.291 0.002 -1.526 0.258 316 
6200 Security And Commodity Brokers 0.569 0.341 -0.004 -1.371 0.081 499 
6300 Insurance Carriers -0.199 0.165 -0.014 -1.162 -0.319 519 
6400 Insurance Agents, Brokers, And Service -0.165 0.121 -0.003 -1.937 0.097 170 
6500 Real Estate -0.268 0.355 -0.003 -1.644 0.147 548 
6700 Holding And Other Investment Offices 0.205 0.621 -0.013 -1.458 0.397 546 
7000 Hotels, Rooming Houses 0.152 0.137 -0.007 -1.552 -0.160 490 
7200 Personal Services -0.152 0.149 -0.012 -2.185 0.255 113 
7300 Business Services -0.174 0.355 -0.002 -1.541 0.166 553 
7500 Automotive Repair, Services, And Parking -0.107 0.113 -0.021 -1.767 -0.287 172 
7600 Miscellaneous Repair Services 0.202 0.090 -0.024 -2.048 -0.132 57 
7800 Motion Pictures -0.161 0.156 -0.002 -1.847 0.129 208 
7900 Amusement And Recreation -0.220 0.184 -0.002 -2.013 0.233 356 
8000 Health Services 0.262 0.235 -0.005 -1.936 0.225 299 
8100 Legal Services -0.109 - 0.038 -2.826 - 9 
8200 Educational Services -0.443 0.249 0.000 -1.911 0.225 192 
8300 Social Services 0.425 0.221 -0.018 -2.442 0.609 72 
8400 Museums, Art Galleries -0.201 0.110 -0.111 -2.516 -1.013 25 
8700 Engineering And Related Services -0.436 0.219 -0.011 -1.616 -0.003 442 
9900 Nonclassifiable Establishments -0.212 0.249 0.022 -2.123 0.485 78 
Average: 
  -0.139 0.234 -0.008 -1.701 0.038 359 
Total: 
            25,854 
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Table IV 
Opacity sample: Descriptive statistics by country, 1990-2005. 
 
This table contains summary statistics of the opacity sample by country (averages across industries and years, 1990-2005). The variables are: accounting 
opacity, insider opacity, informational opacity, aggregate opacity, predation, autocracy, GDP per capita, oil reserves, and oil production. GDP per capita 
comes from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Oil reserves are expressed in tens of millions of barrels. Oil production is expressed in thousands of barrels 
(daily), average 1990-2005. Oil reserves and oil production statistics are from the 2007 BP Statistical Review. U.S. is dropped from the sample. “Number of 
industries” is the aggregate number of country observations across all industries and years, 1990-2005. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
Country 
accounting 
opacity 
insider 
opacity 
informational 
opacity 
aggregate 
opacity predation autocracy 
GDP per 
capita 
oil 
reserves 
oil 
production 
number of 
industries 
Argentina 0.108 -0.038 -0.962 -0.671 4.570 2.616 $11,268 244 744 330 
Australia 0.442 0.009 -2.171 0.751 0.894 0.000 $24,471 405 637 943 
Austria 0.121 -0.024 -1.866 -0.012 1.587 0.000 $26,332 0 0 372 
Belgium 0.092 0.006 -1.916 0.088 2.488 0.000 $25,357 0 0 490 
Brazil 1.544 0.009 -1.678 2.110 6.415 2.000 $6,927 753 1,047 632 
Canada 0.158 0.000 -2.299 0.409 1.020 0.000 $25,968 1,387 2,538 979 
Chile 0.080 -0.019 -1.602 -0.242 2.068 1.720 $8,220 0 0 460 
China 0.162 -0.032 -0.154 -1.115 7.188 17.000 $3,831 1,654 3,154 668 
Columbia 0.052 -0.009 -1.262 -0.407 6.166 2.521 $6,281 228 584 141 
Czech Rep. 0.134 -0.002 -1.994 0.191 3.821 0.000 $13,658 0 0 122 
Denmark 0.119 0.005 -2.088 0.236 1.159 0.000 $25,857 97 259 525 
Egypt 0.085 -0.029 -1.077 -0.585 5.690 15.186 $3,493 365 837 91 
Finland 0.080 0.017 -1.945 0.212 1.113 0.000 $23,859 0 0 470 
France 0.152 -0.005 -2.111 0.266 2.235 1.000 $24,528 0 0 968 
Germany 0.157 -0.014 -2.059 0.250 1.864 0.000 $23,944 0 0 863 
Greece 0.173 -0.031 -1.083 -0.488 4.026 0.000 $16,296 0 0 651 
Hong Kong 0.378 -0.011 -1.500 0.134 1.001 - $23,850 0 0 850 
Hungary 0.085 -0.024 -1.678 -0.151 3.310 0.000 $12,076 0 0 171 
India 0.113 -0.027 -1.292 -0.373 6.264 1.321 $2,234 562 757 634 
Indonesia 0.198 0.008 -1.403 -0.153 7.715 10.854 $2,748 500 1,451 639 
Ireland 0.094 -0.038 -1.947 0.076 1.978 1.807 $25,375 0 0 283 
Israel 0.105 -0.008 -0.959 -0.655 3.336 0.447 $18,806 0 0 413 
Italy 0.099 0.003 -1.485 -0.133 4.480 0.000 $23,802 73 98 593 
Japan 0.069 -0.013 -1.458 -0.314 1.754 0.000 $24,286 0 0 1,030 
Korea 0.124 -0.015 -1.365 -0.318 2.900 3.057 $15,005  0 0 831 
Luxembourg  0.070 -0.005 -2.101 -0.026 1.007 0 $46,042  0 0 115 
Malaysia  0.152 -0.014 -0.777 -0.657 4.072 6.661 $7,785  0 0 899 
Mexico  0.974 -0.006 -1.484 0.966 6.538 4.736 $8,111  460 747 367 
Morocco  0.092 -0.062 -1.154 -0.733 7.012 16.316 $3,791  3,562 3,379 98 
Netherlands  0.150 -0.002 -1.946 0.149 1.240 0 $25,648  0 0 556 
New Zealand  0.990 0.007 -2.298 1.58 0.599 0 $19,669  0 0 564 
Norway  0.140 0.016 -1.772 0.087 1.299 0 $31,475  0 0 434 
Pakistan  0.109 -0.019 -1.355 -0.39 7.433 8.164 $1,821  1,035 2,886 305 
Peru  0.069 0.004 -2.144 0.142 6.163 6.946 $4,588  0 0 182 
Philippines  0.299 0.029 -1.562 0.214 6.205 2 $3,678  89 112 438 
Poland  0.138 -0.013 -1.492 -0.182 4.048 0.783 $10,115  0 0 311 
Portugal  0.099 -0.011 -1.882 0.033 2.631 0 $16,129  0 0 359 
Russia  0.069 0.028 -1.011 -0.66 8.302 4.382 $8,110  0 0 125 
Singapore  0.184 0.007 -1.294 -0.206 0.783 12 $24,432  6,570 7,563 780 
South Africa  0.322 -0.002 -1.963 0.423 5.804 1.549 $9,540  0 0 740 
Spain  0.083 -0.032 -1.767 -0.162 2.923 0 $19,558  0 0 551 
Sri Lanka  0.102 0.008 -0.905 -0.546 5.890 4.756 $2,554  0 0 204 
Sweden  0.172 0.005 -1.718 0.052 0.748 0 $25,153  0 0 615 
Switzerland  0.087 0.009 -1.961 0.127 1.057 0 $29,194  0 0 544 
Taiwan  0.091 -0.037 -0.811 -0.758 2.534 2.572 $20,284  0 0 699 
Thailand  0.187 0.005 -1.275 -0.17 4.069 1.938 $6,052  38 137 786 
Turkey  0.131 -0.019 -1.523 -0.231 5.449 2.425 $5,853  0 0 548 
U.K.  0.115 -0.031 -1.935 -0.019 0.391 0 $23,484  453 2,388 1031 
Venezuela  0.088 -0.005 -1.12 -0.585 7.316 2.547 $5,696  7,192 2,906 134 
Zimbabwe  - -0.022 -1.647 - 7.12 16.103 $1,974  0 0 145 
Average 
 -0.009 -1.565 -0.050 3.714 3.131 $15,584 513 645 513.580 
Total 
                  25,679 
 63 
Table V 
Opacity sample: Correlation coefficients between main variables. 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the main variables of the opacity sample. The numbers in parentheses are probability levels at which the hypothesis of zero correlation can 
be rejected. The coefficients significant at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) or higher are in boldface. The coefficients between industry oil price-dependency and country predation, 
autocracy, GDP per capita, and oil reserves are not reported because industry oil price-dependency is country-invariant. GDP per capita is from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Oil reserves are 
expressed in tens of millions of barrels. Oil reserves statistics are from 2007 BP Statistical Review. Industries from the U.S. are dropped from the sample. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
  
oil price-
dependency accounting opacity insider opacity 
informational 
opacity 
Aggregate 
opacity predation autocracy GDP per capita 
industry accounting opacity -0.0032               
  (0.63)               
industry insider opacity -0.0006 0.0239             
  (0.93) (0.00)             
industry informational opacity 0.0147 0.0587 0.0516           
  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)           
industry aggregate opacity 0.0057 0.5747 0.6785 0.5497         
  (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
country predation - 0.1247 -0.0081 0.2438 0.0872       
    (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00)       
country autocracy - -0.0059 -0.0329 0.3056 -0.0052 0.4640     
    (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00)     
country GDP per capita - -0.1213 0.0144 -0.2918 -0.0923 -0.7737 -0.4712   
    (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
country oil reserves - 0.1230 0.0098 0.0774 0.1773 0.3115 0.1955 -0.1765 
    (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table X 
Capital allocation sample: Descriptive statistics by country. 
 
This table contains summary statistics by country. The variables are: GDP per capita, allocation efficiency, industry growth, 
financial development, predation, and autocracy. U.S. is dropped from the sample. “Number of industries” is the number of 
industry observations across countries. The variables are defined in Table II. 
 
country 
GDP per 
capita 
allocation 
efficiency 
industry 
growth 
financial 
development predation autocracy 
number of 
industries 
Australia $9,866  0.617 2.811% 0.820 0.658 0.000 40 
Austria $9,554 0.546 4.733% 0.996 0.412 0.000 39 
Bangladesh $121 0.142 5.432% 0.199 6.797 15.545 28 
Belgium $11,226 0.535 0.310% 0.654 0.211 0.000 19 
Brazil $1,650 0.494 4.465% 0.325 3.108 7.455 24 
Canada $10,486 0.614 2.902% 0.977 0.132 0.000 40 
Chile $2,531 0.959 6.249% 0.743 3.330 13.273 40 
Colombia $1,150 0.261 3.927% 0.214 3.981 2.000 40 
Costa Rica $2,155 - 5.942% 0.531 3.531 0.000 34 
Denmark $12,188 0.715 2.132% 0.559 0.135 0.000 32 
Egypt $563 0.297 9.672% 0.741 5.071 14.909 40 
Finland $10,181 0.685 3.023% 0.523 0.138 0.000 40 
France $11,337 0.753 2.691% 0.696 0.462 1.545 33 
Germany $12,345 1.274 3.825% 1.084 0.284 0.000 35 
Greece $3,814 0.251 2.594% 0.740 3.554 1.091 40 
India $240 -0.114 7.519% 0.496 3.778 2.000 40 
Israel $3,573 0.834 2.556% 1.181 2.820 1.000 33 
Italy $6,460 0.437 1.632% 0.975 1.492 0.000 24 
Japan $9,912 0.773 6.789% 1.305 0.431 0.000 38 
Jordan $1,109 0.344 8.592% 1.164 5.075 18.455 18 
Kenya $417 0.180 2.722% 0.279 4.006 16.818 22 
Korea $1,407 0.741 13.761% 0.626 3.213 11.818 38 
Malaysia $1,683 0.756 9.480% 1.187 2.488 6.000 39 
Mexico $2,651 0.612 -2.214% 0.387 4.060 12.182 38 
Morocco $807 0.342 8.906% 0.409 5.007 18.000 13 
Netherlands $11,155 0.611 -0.769% 0.910 0.000 0.000 14 
New Zealand $7,490 0.975 2.607% 0.591 0.125 0.000 20 
Nigeria $113 -0.104 -7.467% - 5.969 11.545 28 
Norway $13,430 0.529 0.287% 0.629 0.138 0.000 35 
Pakistan $290 -0.401 8.187% 0.528 5.370 12.091 35 
Peru $842 0.451 -3.334% 0.283 5.698 2.909 40 
Philippines $729 0.304 -0.756% 0.460 6.283 10.909 33 
Portugal $2,301 0.319 2.049% 0.820 1.955 0.182 36 
Singapore $4,661 0.615 8.769% 1.962 0.997 12.000 29 
South Africa $2,899 0.471 2.188% 1.512 2.183 5.909 30 
Spain $5,087 1.188 2.387% 1.025 1.772 0.182 40 
Sri Lanka $252 0.784 -1.834% 0.440 4.806 4.727 27 
Sweden $14,368 1.434 1.697% 0.791 0.128 0.000 39 
Turkey $1,081 0.441 12.800% 0.354 4.151 5.909 40 
U.K. $9,600 0.461 2.045% 0.778 0.249 0.000 40 
Venezuela $3,975 0.529 -1.672% 0.343 3.984 1.000 37 
Zimbabwe $441 0.100 2.156% 1.012 4.675 10.455 22 
Average $4,908 0.531 3.566% 0.738 4.675 5.236 33 
Total 
          
 1,372 
 
